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Abstract 
The study discusses the historical development of the Sino-Nigerian bilateral 
relations. The paper provides a detailed view of china's FDI in Nigeria and the diverse 
challenges faced by the oil rich country to develop its own economy through NEEDS as a 
result of china's economic power. China’s partnership with Nigeria is ideally for 
economic growth but practically poisonous to Nigeria’s development goals as China is 
solely pursuing its own interest and diverting its partner from working toward its NEEDS 
goal. A deep investigation of the relations should be reviewed for both countries. This 
will be needed to produce vital economic growth and ensure a better co-ordination for 
both countries and to a great extent use the procedures that are most beneficial for a “win- 
win” partnership. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy: Policy and Importance 
Nigeria is a geographically diverse fragmented country with one of the largest 
populations in West Africa. Nigeria’s population has over 250 ethnic groups with English 
being the country’s first language. Nigeria is also one of the richest countries on the 
continent endowed with natural resources: oil and gas. It is the 12th largest producer of oil 
in the world as well, which attracts foreign investors from all over the world. Although 
Nigeria is rich in natural resources, 7 of every 10 Nigerians live on less than $1 a day 
(National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy, 2005, p. ix). In search of a 
better way to reduce poverty and tackle some of the problems it is facing, the government 
created one of the most important documents necessary to fulfill its wishes: the National 
Economic Empowerment Development Strategy, or NEEDS. NEEDS is viewed as 
Nigeria’s plan for prosperity and was created in 2005 by the Nigerian National Planning 
Commission (NEEDS, 2005, p. viii).  
“It is the people’s way of letting the government know what kind of Nigeria they 
wish to live in, now and in the future. It is the government’s way of letting the 
people know how it plans to overcome the deep and pervasive obstacles to 
progress that the government and the people have identified. It is also a way of 
letting the international community know where Nigeria stands—in the region 
and in the world—and how it wishes to be supported” (ibid).  
 
NEEDS’ brochure outlines strategies as follows: reorienting values, reducing 
poverty, creating wealth, and generating employment. It is based on different goals of 
creating a better business environment to provide Nigerians with basic needs, 
empowering people and creating reforms that will set Nigeria’s vision to become Africa’s 
largest economy and a major player in the global economy. NEEDS advances strategies 
and methods to make its plan for Nigerian prosperity flourish over the coming years by 
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setting a charter that will help the country achieve these goals as well as the ways to 
achieve them. “The success of NEEDS rests on three pillars: empowering our people, 
creating a legal and financial environment that enables us to make the most of our natural 
resources and flair for business, and reforming our laws and the way our government 
works” (ibid, p. xv). NEEDS is not just a plan, it is a process of development supported 
by clear visions, values, and principles (NEEDS, 2005, p. 2).    
The focus of the assessment of this research is on the implementation of NEEDS, 
and on China’s investment alignment with Nigeria’s goals in NEEDS. I argue that not 
only is NEEDS hard to implement in Nigeria, but also that China’s investments in trade, 
oil, and debt are diverting from NEEDS, which in turn impacts Nigeria’s development 
aspirations.  
State’s Objectives in NEEDS 
NEEDS’ values, principles and visions rest on four main goals: wealth creation, 
employment generation, poverty reduction, and value re-orientation. These goals center 
around a macro economic framework that focuses on three missions: empowering people, 
promoting private enterprise, and changing the way government does its work. The 
empowerment of people is about providing Nigerians with their individual rights and 
delivering the basic necessities for a better human existent. This social pillar created a 
development approach to improve health, education, environment, housing, employment 
and youth employment, safety nets, gender and geopolitical balance and pension reforms.  
The promotion of the private enterprise is mostly to reduce the dominance of the 
public sector and strong reliance on oil. Creating an approach to promote Nigerian’s 
economy through security and rule of law; infrastructure finance, sectorial strategies; 
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privatization and liberalization; trade; regional integration and globalization, will create 
more opportunities for domestic and regional markets (NEEDS, 2005, p. 53). Changing 
the way government does its work is important in order to restore the professionalism of 
the civil service in Nigeria, which has been greatly undermined over the years. This will 
be channeled through the reformation of the public sector, privatization and 
liberalization, governance, transparency and anti-corruption, service delivery, budget and 
expenditure reforms (NEEDS, 2005, p.  x).  
State’s Methods of Achieving NEEDS 
NEEDS envisaged the reformation of these sectors through different methods. 
Right-sizing the sector and eliminating ghost workers, restoring the professionalism of 
the civil service, rationalizing, restructuring, strengthening institutions, privatizing and 
liberalizing the sector will address the transformation of the public sector, privatization 
and liberalization (NEEDS, 2005, p. 87). Other methods announced to tackle corruption 
and improve transparency in government accounts; accounts of government agencies, and 
joint venture oil companies include reducing waste and improving efficiency of 
government expenditures, enhancing economic coordination, opening and competitive 
tender arrangements for government contracts (NEEDS, 2005, p. 87). Designing massive 
anti-corruption campaigns involving all public officials, including the President, public 
sector reforms to reduce, if not completely eliminate, opportunities for corruption, 
especially through the comprehensive monetization of benefits to public officers, and 
establishing an independent anticorruption agency and an economic and financial crimes 
commission (NEEDS, 2005, p. 87).  
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As part of a policy to improve service quality, budget and expenditure reforms, 
NEEDS states that every government agency will be urged to implement a service 
delivery charter that includes checklists, processing deadlines, and other benchmarks for 
delivery of public services (NEEDS, 2005, p. 91). The charter will mainstream service 
delivery at the national, state, and local government levels. The rationalization envisioned 
in this strategy will involve clearer delineation of roles among the federal, state, and local 
governments in line with the changes in the revenue allocation formula (NEEDS, 2005, p. 
110). The federal government will withdraw from programs and projects best left to state 
and local governments, not only to avoid duplication but also to enhance efficiency in 
implementing and monitoring programs and projects. A federal matching grant scheme 
will be established to promote national programs and projects (NEEDS, 2005, p. 110). 
Other methods explained in NEEDS include the restructuring of the industrial 
sector to promote export, strengthening the private and public sector partnership, and 
reducing imports to develop local industries in order to promote employment and youth 
employment. By promoting local industries, the export percentage can improve and 
reduce the reliance on a single commodity, oil, while creating employment at the same 
time. NEEDS also mentions more allocation of businesses to local industries to increase 
competition in order to facilitate the transfer of technology for the development of the 
country’s infrastructure (NEEDS, 2005, p. 58). This will facilitate the development of the 
industry sector to be more competitive while contributing to the economy, and therefore 
be more efficient through privatization. The importance of privatization in order to 
strengthen local companies’ productivity and effectiveness is emphasized in the charter. 
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The public sector in Nigeria is weak and ineffective; therefore privatization can offer 
effective service provision.  
Another NEEDS’ approach to generate employment and promote local industries 
is through the establishment of a medium- size enterprise sector that will enhance 
economic development, generate employment and create wealth for Nigerians. NEEDS 
notes that two of its ambitions in this sector are the development of indigenous 
entrepreneurial class that can compete in a global market, and the facilitation of Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDIs) among local small- size and medium enterprises to support 
local produced goods.  This will also promote the production of quality goods and 
services in Nigeria to facilitate a competitive export- oriented manufacturing sector 
(NEEDS, 2005, p. 72).  
Elevating local manufacturing companies is also significant to tackle unfair 
competition from dumped, second-hand, counterfeit, smuggled and sub-standard products 
that impede local markets. Several ways of achieving this is through the reduction of the 
oil sector dominance and create a more diversified economic base by increasing 
manufactured goods in exports. This will also facilitate projects that transfer technology 
in the non-oil sector, increase transparency in the management of oil revenues, reduce or 
eliminate corruption, improve transparency in government accounts, maintain a 
substantial debt relief program, and generate revenues from other sources such as local 
enterprises (NEEDS, 2005, p. 116). By reducing oil exports, NEEDS also hopes to reduce 
environmental degradation from oil and gas extraction, which results to unsustainable 
land use and promote environmental standards, as well as local manufacturing (NEEDS, 
2005, p. 65). 
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Nigeria has created a clear and detailed pattern of what and how development 
should be for its prosperity. Nigeria’s objectives are comprehensible, yet raises some 
questions that need answers. Are these goals realistic, reachable, measurable and 
implementable? Are foreign investors disrupting Nigeria’s goals? What are foreign 
investors like China doing in Nigeria? Are China’s investments aligning with NEEDS? 
Why and how does China’s investments align with or differ from NEEDS? How do we 
understand and measure China’s pattern in Nigeria? The aim of this study is to analyze if 
the state’s goals are realistic and implementable. This study also intends to understand if 
China’s engagement in trade, oil, and debt in Nigeria is in alignment with NEEDS and 
offer an explanation to reasons why it has an effect on Nigeria’s development goals.  
NEEDS and State’s Objectives 
This research demonstrates Nigeria’s inability to implement NEEDS, an 
ambitious plan for the transformation of Nigeria. It resembles a policy package that can 
hardly be achieved. NEEDS, like many other programs and policies, appears to create an 
illusion in letting populations believe that the government will better their lives. “It is a 
propaganda exhibit for the government of Nigeria” (Paul Adogamhe, 2010, p. 76).  
NEEDS’ goals seem very unrealistic. The government lacks willingness and 
capacity to help achieve them. The charter outlines the goals, without addressing issues 
of implementation and establishing an agenda for achieving these objectives. There is no 
effective mean for the Nigerian government to achieve some of the goals mentioned in 
the package due to the weakness of the state, and other problems surrounding the 
government’s inabilities and ineffectiveness.  
China in Nigeria 
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I will demonstrate in this paper that there is an apparent disconnect between 
NEEDS and China’s investment true objectives with Nigeria’s oil, trade and debt sectors. 
With no agenda for implementation, not only will NEEDS be hard to achieve, but also 
with investors like China diverging from what Nigeria wants, NEEDS faces essential 
obstacles to be realized. China has no joint partnership with Nigeria, and its involvement 
in the trade, oil, and debt sector does not align with NEEDS. Both countries have signed 
agreements and contracts to promote their relations, on the basis of a “win- win” 
partnership, which is contradictory to the status of their partnership, because China’s 
investments in Nigeria are primarily to promote its own economy. China’s investments 
might benefit some sectors in Nigeria’s economy and able it to grow, but considering that 
each country’s interests are rarely the same, China’s pattern in Nigeria does not align 
with NEEDS. China’s strategy of operations and its investments pose a threat to NEEDS 
in several ways.  
China’s strategy of gaining access into African markets for its own benefit is 
pervasive in Nigeria’s economy. Firstly, by establishing diplomatic relations with 
Nigeria, China offered a small aid package that featured education and trade. The aid 
package grew once Nigeria viewed China as a substitute partner to complete its 
infrastructure deficiency. Through infrastructures, Chinese companies were able to settle 
in Nigeria to complete the different projects that were requested. Access to Nigeria’s oil 
sector was eased for China, because the President attributed many oil blocks to China to 
complete Nigeria’s infrastructure (Alex Vines et al., 2010, p. 11). China later gained 
entrance into other sectors of the economy, which allowed for trade relations and 
imbalances in the Nigerian’s trade sector to grow (Ndubisi Obiorah et al., 2008, p. 274).   
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Chinese Multi National Companies (MNCs) found businesses in the different sectors of 
the economy in Nigeria, which reinforced the partnership between both countries 
(Gregory Mthembu- Salter, 2009, p. 6). 
By investing in free trade zones, China has showed Nigeria that it wants to 
strengthen the bilateral relations between both countries, while integrating Nigerian 
markets and developing business opportunities for Chinese companies. Considering that 
Nigeria has accumulated debt from increased loans to pay for some of the infrastructure 
projects that could not be paid for with oil money and other projects completed by China, 
China has subsequently been able to maintain a stronghold in Nigeria. Subsequently, its 
engagements with the country have continued to grow following its strategic interests. 
This partnership has also been sustained, since China now owns oil assets in Nigeria and 
is also helping in the exploration of more oil and gas.  
This study is important, because it creates a new approach of understanding the 
Sino- Nigerian relations, and analyzing the effects of China in Nigeria, with a focus on 
Nigeria’s developmental goals, which gives a stronger analysis of the relations. 
Theoretical Framework      
For the purpose of this study, the theories of William Reno (1999) and 
neoclassical realists: Michael E. Brown et al (1995), Thomas, J Christensen (1996), 
Randall L. Schweller (1998), William Curti Wohlforth (1993) and Farid Zakaria (1998) 
will be utilized.  The neoclassical realists refine the work of Kenneth Waltz (1990) that 
derive from realism theory.   
A better analysis of NEEDS and the Nigerian government’s objectives will be 
approached through the work of William Reno. It is arguable that Nigeria’s politics still 
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resemble what William Reno calls “Warlord Politics”. The logic behind warlord politics 
is that the state is created but it does not really exist. Rulers form relationships with other 
people in power. It is a setup of elites and authoritarian rulers who buy off their enemies 
and their friends to facilitate their decisions. These rulers then disable any type of 
government arm, and create an informal militia. They also focus on getting aid from the 
developed countries to develop and reduce poverty in their country, but in reality the 
money never reaches the people it was allocated for. Moreover, they try to accumulate 
more wealth by being involved in illegal businesses. The whole system is set up based on 
patronage to benefit those in power that hinders any attempt to be accountable to citizens.  
The rulers create a patronage network inside and outside the country for their own 
benefit. The state is set up to benefit those in power with no one to challenge its 
authority. The citizens and the rest of the world perceive the state to be real and 
functioning, but it is not in reality. The fabrication of the state is just there to amalgamate 
more wealth for their personal use (William Reno, 1999). Nigeria tries to portray that 
warlord politics has disappeared and an actual state exists by designing policy packages 
to display the idea that the government is working and creating programs to develop the 
country. The reality is that, Nigeria’s politics and government is still at the stage of weak 
management and ineffectiveness. The patronage network is created and embedded in 
every sector of the country. No effective leadership can be established to generate a 
mechanism that will be responsible to implement the right policies and decisions for 
reducing poverty, and achieving NEEDS. 
Rulers are more interested in gathering wealth than creating a successful agenda 
that will eradicate the problems faced by their citizens. Corruption from the top often 
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finds its grassroots at the bottom. A corrupted sate barely has any service sector capable 
of managing the affairs of the country. Weak management often leads to 
unproductiveness and inability to prioritize important issues facing a country. Reno 
(1999) concludes by explaining that warlord politics destabilizes the ability of the state’s 
performance, because the pursuit of wealth is the top agenda from leaders to civil 
servants.   
The realist school of thought, considered as the oldest and most important in 
international relations, will be used to serve as the basis to approach the Sino- Nigerian 
relations. The basic ideas behind realist ideas and assumptions are: 1) a pessimistic view 
of human nature; (2) a conviction that international relations are necessary conflicted and 
that international conflicts are often resolved through wars; (3) a high regard for the 
values of national security and state survival and in pursuit of security, states strive to 
secure as many resources as possible; and (4) a skepticism that there can be progress in 
international arena that is comparable to that in domestic political life (Jackson and 
Sorenson, 2007). Realism central focus is the acquisition, maintenance, and exercise of 
power by states. Power often divided into “hard” and “soft” varies depending on the 
issues. Hard power often refers to tangible military capabilities, and soft power results 
from ideas, wealth, and political and economic innovation (Kelly- Kate Pease, 2008). 
Realism further embraces the idea that nations are self-interested and will place their 
interests in the forefront.  
 From this basic theory, neorealism and neoclassical realism were developed. 
Neorealism developed by Kenneth Waltz focuses predominantly on the structure of the 
international system. It was only used to describe political outcomes. “Neoclassical” 
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realism on the other hand, adds the theories of foreign policy to neorealism. 
“Neoclassical” realism argues that the scope and ambition of a foreign country’s foreign 
policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically 
by its relative material power capabilities (Gideon Rose, 1998).   
 One of the “neoclassical” realist’s approaches is to presume that foreign policy 
has its sources in domestic politics. “These Innenpolitik theories argue that internal 
factors such as political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics, or 
socioeconomic structure determine how countries behave toward the world beyond their 
borders” (ibid, p. 150). They also consider the impact the international system has on 
national behavior because the most speculated characteristic of a state in international 
relations is its position in the international system (Rose, 1998, p. 150). They distinguish 
between power resources and a country’s foreign policy interests by which they mean the 
goals and preferences that guide the country external behavior (Rose, 1998, p. 151). 
“Neoclassical” realism incorporates the notion of foreign policy and adds it to 
realism theory of state’s pursuit of interest. Since states are comprised of conflicting 
interests and power distribution, foreign policies overlap and conflict among states. This 
theory is considered the best for analyzing the Sino- Nigerian relations. It is undeniable 
that the relationship between China and Nigeria is based on their own economic growth 
and development. Nigeria views China as an alternative partner for its growth and 
development, while China looks at Nigeria for energy security and a gateway to develop 
its own economy.  
Thus, China’s foreign policy pursued through soft power, does not only consider 
its domestic politics, but also considers its position in the international system to pursue 
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its own interests for its survival. Whereas, Nigeria’s foreign policies inhibit its domestic 
politics and its goals to become an African economic giant by also pursuing its own 
interests and agenda. But interests cannot always align, due to the fact that each country’s 
policy is subjected to its own realities.  
The first theory will guide me towards a better approach of understanding and 
analyzing obstacles behind NEEDS’ implementation. The “neoclassical” realism theory 
will provide a clear understanding of the dynamics behind the Sino- Nigerian relation. 
This approach will attempt to answer the research questions addressed in this study. 
Following sections on literature and methods, this research will first examine NEEDS’ 
implementation, and will later examine the three main sectors of China’s involvement in 
Nigeria: trade, oil and debt, by incorporating the two theories. I will then evaluate the 
results of China’s involvement in these three different sectors and their alignment with or 
divergence from Nigeria’s development aspirations as detailed in NEEDS in regards to 
these three sectors. Finally, I will discuss if the results of my findings follow the pattern 
Nigeria envisaged by opening its market to foreign investors as a development strategy, 
as well as the consequences of China’s engagement pattern on Nigeria’s developmental 
goals. 
Definition of Terms 
1. Bilateral Trade: “Cross border transactions that occur between two countries. A 
number of nations have set up bilateral trade agreements with a major trading 
partner in order to facilitate trade and economic stability between their respective 
countries. Such agreements often substantially reduce barriers to trade such as 
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duties, customs procedures and quotas. It also facilitates trade relations between 
two countries” (Bilateral Trade)  
2. Black Market: “Illegal free market that flourishes in economies where consumer 
goods are scarce or are heavily taxed. In the first kind, black market prices are 
higher than the 'official' or controlled prices. In the second kind, prices are lower 
than the 'legitimate' or taxed prices, due to tax evasion.” (Black Market) 
3. Concessional Loans: “Grants and subsidized loans that carry market or near- 
market terms and therefore are not foreign aid”. (OECD) 
4. Debt Overhang: “The accumulation of a stock of debt so large as to threaten the 
country's ability to repay its past loans, which, in turn, scares off potential lenders 
and investors.” (Reisen and Ndoye, 2008, p. 11) 
5. Debt Sustainability: “1) A country’s medium- to long-term debt situation. A 
country’s eligibility for support under the HIPC Initiative is determined on the 
basis of the analysis of its debt situation, jointly undertaken by the staffs of the 
IMF, the World Bank, and the country concerned. 2) It also implies a country’s 
solvency plus liquidity at any moment.” (OECD) 
6. Development: “The act or process of growing, progressing developing or the 
state of being developed. 2) A fact, event or happening that changes a situation.” 
(Development) 
7. Diplomacy: “1) The art and practice of conducting international relations, as in 
negotiating alliances, treaties, and agreements between nations for the purpose of 
maintaining cohesion and peace. 2) Diplomacy seeks maximum national 
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advantage without using force and preferably without causing resentment.” 
(Diplomacy)  
8. Foreign Aid: “1) Financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities that are 
designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective 
(excluding aid for military or other non- development purposes), and are provided 
as either grants or subsidized loans. 2) The policy of a nation of giving economic, 
and technical aid to other countries for purposes of relief and rehabilitation for 
economic stabilization.” (Foreign Aid)       
9. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): “The objective of obtaining a lasting interest 
by a resident entity in one economy in an entity resident in an economy other than 
that of the investor. The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree 
of influence on the management of the enterprise. Direct investment involves both 
the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital 
transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and 
unincorporated.” (OECD)  
10. Foreign Policy: “General objectives that guide the activities and relationships of 
one state in its interactions with other states. The development of foreign policy is 
influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behavior of other states, or 
plans to advance specific geopolitical designs. Foreign policy typically relates to 
considerations of factors such as human rights, terrorism, economy and foreign 
aid to achieve national objectives.” (Foreign Policy) 
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11. Free Trade Zones (FTZs): “Airport, seaport, or any other designated area for 
duty-free import of raw materials, components, sub-assemblies, semi-finished or 
finished goods. Such items can be stored, displayed, assembled, or processed for 
re-export or entry into the general market of the importing country (after paying 
the required duties). Also called foreign trade zone or free zone.” (Free Trade 
Zone)       
12. Globalization: “The act or process of globalizing; the state of being globalized. It 
is the worldwide movement toward economic, financial, trade, and 
communications integration. Globalization implies the opening of local and 
nationalistic perspectives to a broader outlook of an interconnected and 
interdependent world with free transfer of capital, goods, and services across 
national frontiers.” (Globalization) 
13. Gross Domestic Product (GDP): “The value of a country’s overall output of 
goods and services (typically during one fiscal year) at market prices, excluding 
net incomes from abroad. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) can be estimated in 
three ways, which, in theory should yield identical figures. They are (1) 
Expenditure basis: how much money was spent, (2) Output basis: how many 
goods and services were sold, and (3) Income basis: how much income (profit) 
was earned.” (Gross Domestic Product) 
14. Imprudent Lending: “Lending a large amount of money to a country to the 
extent of having its debt not fully serviced, which endangers the debt 
sustainability of that country.” (Reisen and Ndoye, 2008, p. 20). 
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15. Licensing Round: “A coordinated offering of exploration acreage to oil 
companies by governmental authorities, typically in return for fees and/or a 
commitment to carry out a work program.” (Licensing Round) 
16. Market: “An actual or nominal place where forces of demand and supply 
operate, and where buyers and sellers interact (directly or through intermediaries) 
to trade goods, services, or contracts or instruments, for money or barter.” 
(Market) 
17. Net Present Value (NPV): “NPV is the discounted sum of all future debt-service 
obligations (interest and principal) on existing debt.” (Reisen and Ndoye, 2008, p. 
20).  
18. Oil Exploration License (OEL): “A license to explore for petroleum.” 
(Petroleum Act) 
19. Oil Mining Lease (OML): “A lease to search for, win, work, carry away, and 
dispose of petroleum.” (Petroleum Act) 
20. Oil Prospecting License (OPL): “A license to prospect for petroleum.” 
(Petroleum Act) 
21. Resource Curse: “The resource curse holds that underdeveloped countries with 
great natural wealth fail to diversify their industry or to invest in human 
development, which leads to a long-term economic decline.” (Ali Zafar, 2007, p. 
109)  
22. Revenue: “The income generated from sale of goods or services, or any other use 
of capital or assets, associated with the main operations of an organization before 
any costs or expenses are deducted. Revenue is shown usually as the top item in 
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an income (profit and loss) statement from which all charges, costs, and expenses 
are subtracted to arrive at net income.” (Revenue) 
23. State-Owned Enterprise (SOEs): “Business entities established by central and 
local governments, and whose supervisory officials are from the government. 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) are wholly or partially owned by a government 
and is typically earmarked to participate in commercial activities.” (OECD)  
24. Structural Adjustment Programs: “Policy changes for economic reforms aimed 
at improving or liberalizing an economy, imposed and implemented by the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund on poor or developing countries in 
exchange for new loans.” (Structural Adjustment Program)  
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Chapter II: Review of the Literature  
 
Since this study is concerned with the inability to implement NEEDS in Nigeria, 
and China’s investments and engagements in the Nigerian trade; oil and debt sector, it is 
important to understand the current opinions on the topic. China’s strategy of operations 
in Nigeria follows the same pattern in other African countries, but the focus of this 
research is the analysis of China’s pattern in trade, oil, and debt in Nigeria and its 
compatibility to the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS). 
I will examine the field of current researches on the implementation of NEEDS, and on 
China’s engagements in trade, oil, and debt in Nigeria by outlining the main concepts of 
NEEDS and of China’s engagements in these three sectors, which will be used in my 
analysis. This literature is mostly an interpretation of the available sources that will be 
used to back up evidence of the concepts that will be discussed in my data analysis. The 
literature will be organized around the main themes.  
The first section of the literature will discuss the difficulty in implementing 
NEEDS in Nigeria. The second section will focus on China- Nigeria relations in trade 
along with different opinions of China’s investments in Nigeria’s trade sector. The third 
section will focus on research of China’s entry in the oil sector as well as the challenges 
Chinese oil companies have been facing in Nigeria’s oil sector. The fourth section 
discusses sources’ opinions on the role of debt in the Sino- Nigerian relations.  
The first section explains how problematic NEEDS will be hard to implement 
while the other three sections explicate how the Sino- Nigeria relations gradually 
A Tale of Two Superpowers: Nigeria and China Relations 
 29
developed for Nigeria to become important to China’s investments, as well as the main 
arguments regarding NEEDS implementation and China’s involvement in these sectors.  
All of these themes will be discussed using several sources to highlight the 
essential arguments when making my point. These sources are all significant, because 
they all have a unique way of approaching the state’s objectives in NEEDS, and China 
and Nigeria’s relations. By analyzing the benefits and inconveniences of China’s 
investments in the different areas of Nigeria’s economy, and the recommendations to 
make this partnership beneficial to both countries, these authors give an evaluation of the 
relations. The goal of using these sources in my research is to investigate the particular 
concepts around China’s investments in each of these three sectors, which are all goals 
that NEEDS’ targets for Nigeria’s development aspirations.  
Implementing NEEDS 
NEEDS’ success depends on a variety of factors that are hard to reach in Nigeria. 
The most important factor for NEEDS’ success is implementation. Implementation is an 
essential step for a state to achieve its targets and integrate its policies. Nigeria does not 
have the ability to implement the right policies targeted in NEEDS, because it lacks 
implementation methods. Implementation cannot be sustained in Nigeria because of 
different problems that affect the state. One essential problem to successful 
implementation of NEEDS is corruption.  
Corruption is an important obstacle to achieve state’s goals. Nigeria is plagued 
with too much corruption for any policy to be successfully implemented in the country. 
Weak leadership and management, lack of planning and lack of willingness also have an 
impact on the state’s ability to deliver. Due to corruption in all sectors of the government, 
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there is no ability and willingness to plan and manage any state’s policy and target. Along 
with that are a weak mechanism and political structure, and lack of appropriate fund to 
achieve different objectives. Nigeria’s political structure is fill with elites chasing wealth 
and appropriating government’s funds for personal uses. As a result of all these problems, 
the implementation of NEEDS will be hard to accomplish.  
From gathered evidence, Adogamhe (2010) explains that NEEDS is one of 
Nigeria’s numerous plans. However its creation is flawed to a great extent, which makes 
implementation barely possible (Eneh, 2011; Bambale, 2011; Marcellus, 2009). 
Adogamhe (2010) acknowledges some of the charter’s good intentions, but he argues that 
there are failures in the plan to target the important population, and no real strategy was 
created to address the issues that can create development. “It appears that the authors of 
NEEDS approached poverty from the perspective of an income or consumption index, as 
is customary with several Nigerian scholars who deal with poverty evaluation” (ibid, p. 
53).  
The evidence suggests that the majority of the poor population was not 
acknowledged in NEEDS, and little is known about structure; strengths; weaknesses and 
mode of operations. “Consequently, this population is unknown and un-provided for by 
the NEEDS document. To do justice, to a comprehensive plan for prosperity for this 
population, NEEDS must recognize this omission and rectify it” (ibid, p. 64). Adogamhe 
(2010) also adds that NEEDS’ failure to recognize the ineffectiveness of the system and 
political structure proves that no real measures wants to be taken to achieve those goals 
(Eneh, 2011; Bambale, 2011). “NEEDS did not prioritize the goals it set, nor did it 
outline the benchmarks or stages of development for the attainment of these goals” 
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(Adogamhe, 2010, p. 67). Evidence from the research showed that the government is 
structurally handicapped to handle the programs outlined in NEEDS. 
In his analysis of Nigeria’s development visions, Eneh (2011) argues that most 
visions, plans, programs and projects have failed in Nigeria as a result of weak 
management and corruption (Adogamhe, 2010; Bambale, 2011). “Where there is no 
vision, the people perish is an aphorism that has become common knowledge among the 
Nigerian political leaders who often articulate visions in colorful and expensive 
development plans, policies, programmes, etc., but mostly for chanting” (Eneh, 2011, p. 
63). Nigeria is good at creating visions, policies and plans, but most of them fail at been 
implemented as a result of corruption, and lack of willingness from political leaders 
(Eneh, 2011; Adogamhe, 2010; Bambale, 2011).  
“They are chicken- hearted in the implementation of these plans, except to enrich 
cronies, political stooges and royal choristers or sycophants. At the end of 
political leaders tenure, no actualization of the vision and no regrets for the 
failure; no review and no direction have been done. Yet, such a non- performing 
leader often aspires to continue in office even after his tenure has expired” (Eneh, 
2011: 63).  
 
 In his search of reasons behind failed development implementation of 
development projects and underdevelopment in Nigeria, Eneh (2011) investigates past 
governments in Nigeria and their different development projects and visions. From the 
Gowon administration in 1970 till date, a lot of policies have been formulated to improve 
the quality of life and tackle some of the country’s problems, but most of them end up 
been just policies due to corruption (Eneh, 2011). “Nigeria is replete with brilliant, 
impeccable and well-written policies. The problem is implementation. The logical and 
expensively produced policies often end there as policies. Weak efforts at implementation 
often rubbish them trough corruption” (ibid, p. 66). Eneh (2011) goes further to argue 
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that corruption is Nigeria’s number one enemy, and only when it is removed will policies 
such as NEEDS be successful. In his conclusion, Eneh (2011) urges political leaders to 
stop breading and perpetuating corruption for any successful implementation of NEEDS.  
Along with Eneh’s ideas (2011), Bambale (2011) also indicates the effects of 
weak leadership and corruption to NEEDS’ success. Bambale (2011) argues that because 
of political leaders’ behaviors, projects and policies may never see rise in Nigeria 
(Adogamhe, 2010).  From Bambale’s research (2011), major obstacles to improving 
opportunities remains at the state level. A reformation of Nigeria’s leadership where the 
political will exists is lacking in Nigeria. “The major obstacles to improving opportunities 
and capabilities of the poor and reducing their vulnerabilities contained in the reforms 
remain at the level of Nigeria’s leadership where the political will and ethical 
considerations seem to be lacking” (ibid, p. 22). 
Bambale (2011) implies that for NEEDS to be successful, Nigeria needs an 
effective leader that is committed to achieve Nigeria’s development goals, and a system 
that is not corrupted (Eneh, 2011; Adogamhe, 2010; Marcellus; 2009). Without these 
attributes, hardly will the state’s objectives see rise. From Bambale’s point of view 
(2011), Nigeria must focus on leadership and stronger state institutions for reforms to 
significantly reduce poverty and stimulate economic progress. In addition, weak 
institutions and structures also remain a detriment to sustainable growth and the success 
of NEEDS (Bambale, 2011; Eneh, 2011; Marcellus, 2009). “Leadership and stronger 
institutions for successful neoliberal reforms including NEEDS could be achieve through 
promotion of popular democracy, free and fair election and quality education” (ibid, p. 
22). 
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Due to Nigeria’s weakness, there was no mechanism or framework created to 
address the proclaimed goals (Marcellus, 2009). In his investigation of NEEDS’ strategy 
to reduce poverty in Nigeria, Marcellus (2009) finds that poverty level has only 
increased, and the plan has not been realized. “The realization of the poverty eradication 
plan is yet a far cry. Special programs and infrastructures through which the government 
hopes to empower the citizens especially the most vulnerable ones have not been 
efficiently provided” (ibid, p. 205). According to Marcellus (2009), there was no 
appropriate fund created by the government to undertake some of the objectives such as 
poverty reduction.  
The funds created couldn’t be sufficient in working towards achieving the 
objective. Moreover, Anger (2010) observes that there was misappropriation of funds, 
and the little amount of funds created did not go towards addressing poverty reduction in 
Nigeria. He notes that as a result of corruption, funds created to carry out the program in 
NEEDS failed. “The probe revealed that over 10 billion US dollars was said to have been 
spent on the National Integrated Power Project without any result to show for it” (ibid, p. 
141). In his conclusions, for achieving NEEDS’ goals “the federal state and local 
government must ensure commitment in the areas of fund allocation” (ibid, p. 143).  
Trade Relations 
The bilateral trade relation between China and Nigeria was the link that opened 
doors to the many problems facing the relations today. Trade relations between both 
countries have resulted to more troubles to Nigerians and Nigeria’s economy. Trade 
between both countries has created trade imbalances in favor of China, and an increase of 
cheap products from China dumped into the Nigerian market. Smuggling of goods, black 
A Tale of Two Superpowers: Nigeria and China Relations 
 34
markets, and illegal towns are all results of Chinese exports to Nigeria. The Nigerian 
market has suffered as a result of these problems that have perpetually led to de-
industrialization, unemployment, and infringed labor laws. Trade relations with China is 
boosting Nigerian markets to be filled with Chinese goods and enterprises as a result of 
foreign direct investments (FDIs) that are increasingly posing a problem to Nigeria’s 
economy. 
In the awakening of China- Nigeria relations, a diplomatic tie that favored 
exchanged formal visits between both countries leaders and representatives, and the 
signing of diplomatic relations between both countries was the glue that kept both 
countries close (Ogunsanwo, 2008; Methembu- Salter, 2009). But after a long friendly 
relation, both countries decided to take the partnership forward. Ogunsanwo (2008) notes 
that in 1972, Adebayo Adedeji, Nigerian Commissioner for Economic Reconstruction 
and Development at that time, went to Beijing to step up the relation by signing 
agreements on economic and technical cooperation that included trade.  
It was from this agreement that the trade relations evolved, because it allowed the 
entry of unlimited Chinese goods in the country. Ogunsanwo (2008) observes that the 
trade agreement between both countries merely had an impact because there was already 
a significant amount of Chinese goods that have been entering Nigeria for years, and 
were becoming hard to control. “The trade agreement was hardly significant as it had no 
impact on the largely unregulated imports of Chinese goods that had been entering 
Nigeria for years and were to become impossible to control in the years ahead” (ibid, p. 
192). 
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 In the outset of the relations, Ogunsanwo (2008) posits that the economic 
cooperation between both countries was open ended and allowed Nigeria to request a 
good amount of projects from China, but there was little demand from Nigeria, which 
made it differ from other African states that immediately began assistance after creating 
relations. “The Nigerian engagement had differed from Beijing’s relations with other 
African states, where technical and financial assistance usually began to flow almost 
immediately after forging formal relations” (ibid, p. 192). 
Regardless, trade imports grew over the years. Ogunsawo (2008) emphasized the 
importance of imports from China to Nigeria between 1972 and 1974 that totaled to 
millions of dollars, which only grew overtime. He adds that the technical and economic 
cooperation evolved more through the trade sector, because bilateral trade between both 
countries played a big role in the relations. “Between 1972 and 1974, Nigerian exports to 
China totalled US$14 million, whereas imports from China totalled US$249 million” 
(ibid, p. 193).  
Mthembu- Salter (2009) notes that bilateral trade expanded, and in 2008 it was 
worth 7.3 billion, nearly nine times the level in 2000, but with a trade imbalance that has 
persisted and indeed worsened. “Right from these early stages, the terms of trade were 
heavily in China’s favour, with GBP 4 million of the trade recorded in 1970 derived from 
Chinese textile exports to Nigeria” (ibid, p. 10). Increased trade imbalances between both 
countries were viewed by many as detrimental or exploitive to Nigeria, and Ogunsanwo 
(2008) indicates that as a result, Nigeria’s economy became known as a ‘cargo economy’ 
with ships laden with containers docking at Nigeria’s ports and returning almost empty to 
their places of origin, as Nigeria does not have much to export.  
A Tale of Two Superpowers: Nigeria and China Relations 
 36
Amadasun (2008) remarked that the trade imbalance between both countries also 
became an issue because of the vast sales of sub-standard Chinese manufactured goods to 
the Nigerian population at the expense of Nigeria’s industry. “There was no favorable 
trading balance with China. Nigeria has always had to buy from China without selling its 
own products to China. This coupled with the trend of dumping Chinese rejects in 
Nigeria raises concern over China being a threat to the survival of Nigeria’s local 
industries” (ibid, p. 18). Due to the trade imbalance, the different concerns been raised 
are about China’s compliant nature to deliver Nigeria from its development problems 
(Amadasun, 2008). 
Nigeria imported items such as textiles, manufactured goods, electrical apparatus, 
motorcycles, generators, machinery and different other products while Chinas’ exports 
from Nigeria, was mainly coming from the oil sector (Mthembu- Salter, 2009). Chinese 
products in Nigeria created some resentment. “Nigerian trade unions have been reported 
as blaming Chinese imports for the loss of 350, 000 Nigerian manufacturing jobs, chiefly 
in the textile sector” (ibid, p. 11). Most of the job loss has been from manufacturing 
industries, particularly from the textile industries where employment and domestic 
production has been heavily impacted by Chinese products (Mthembu- Salter, 2009).  
Gathered research and evidence from Adeuwyi et al (2010) have demonstrated 
that China’s exports to Nigeria have attracted more consumers than locally produced 
goods. In their research, the authors discover several reasons for market loss by 
Nigerians. “It was discovered from the field survey that many of the consumers used 
made-in-China product. The main reasons for consuming Chinese products are the 
relative low prices, product availability, quality, technology, and packaging” (ibid, p. 92).  
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In addition, the authors found out that goods from China have created discomfort to 
Nigerian consumers. “On the sources of discomforts experienced by the consumers, 
majority of the consumers revealed that Chinese products are characterized by high 
frequency of breakdown, low quality and most of the products from China are not easy 
and cheap to repair” (ibid, p. 93). From their evidence, the increase of China’s goods into 
Nigerian markets has reduced local production as well as consumption.       
 In Akinrinade and Ogen’s research, they examine the effects of China’s exports 
to Nigeria (2008). Akinrinade and Ogen (2008) argue that Chinas’ imports and goods 
have also created a weak industry in Nigeria. They identify China’s policy and method as 
that of de-industrialization in Nigeria, which is a result of goods that are problematic and 
create antagonism in Nigeria. “Available evidence suggests that China’s growing global 
competitiveness and its offensives in the Nigerian textile market have damaging impacts 
on the Nigerian economy” (ibid, p. 166).  According to their research, China’s policy is 
killing competition from local markets and local manufacturing.  
Akinrinade and Ogen (2008) have identified the easy access to products and the 
price of products as attractive, but dangerous to Nigeria that lost almost all of its 
industries as imports from China have increased. Akinrinade and Ogen (2008) reflect the 
effects of China’s exports to Nigeria’s economy and conclude it as being poisonous. 
“Nigeria has no chance against Chinese competition in reciprocal textile trade relation. 
Nigeria should therefore negotiate a quota system that limits Chinese textile exports to 
Nigeria” (ibid, p. 169). 
Beyond textile, there have also being issues with Chinese trading practices 
(Obiorah et al., 2008). The connotation of Obiorah et al’s effort is that there was much 
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violation in Nigeria’s import and export regulations by Chinese traders, and a significant 
amount of contraband goods imported into the country has been affecting local markets 
(2008). Smuggling of Chinese goods in Nigeria has led to closing several local markets. 
In addition to that, the authors identify China’s business practices as troublesome. 
“Chinese business practices in Nigeria have also raised questions regarding labor 
relations. Chinese companies have been increasingly accused of engagement in poor 
labor practices, harsh treatment of employees, low wages, and poor standards of 
corporate governance” (ibid, p. 280). 
Poor business practices have also contributed to the unemployment factor that has 
created resentment from Nigerians as well. “Resentment has also risen over the use of 
Chinese laborers in construction projects, as well as regarding the increasing takeover of 
Nigerian markets by Chinese traders” (ibid, p. 280).  In the conclusion of their analysis, 
Obiorah et al (2008) view the future of the relationship to be difficult for Nigeria without 
careful management.  
 Despite the growing resentments and issues, Chinese foreign direct investment 
(FDI) doubled in Nigeria. Oyeranti et al (2011) mention the correspondence between 
both countries. Large Chinese natural resource investments and those with large Chinese 
infrastructure financing for power and transport were observed (Oyeranti et al., 2011). 
The authors demonstrate that most Chinese investments in Nigeria have their 
concentration in a few sectors that are of strategic interest to China. “Chinese firms have 
invested billions of dollars and used Chinese engineering and construction resources on 
infrastructure for developing oil, gas, minerals and other natural resources in a number of 
countries including Nigeria” (ibid, p. 189).     
A Tale of Two Superpowers: Nigeria and China Relations 
 39
According to Oyeranti et al (2011), China’s FDI to Nigeria are primarily resource 
seeking and market seeking. “The conclusion is that Chinese direct investment in Nigeria 
and other African countries is driven mainly by the need to secure access and acquire key 
commodity and energy assets and capture under- exploited markets” (ibid, p. 190). Their 
investigation of China’s investments lead them to the conclusion that China’s FDI can 
promote growth, but Nigeria can loose if effective measures are not taken.     
Most Chinese FDIs in Nigeria have allowed the settlement of Chinese oil 
companies, manufacturing companies, construction companies that benefit China and 
bring some growth in Nigeria. The growth of China’s manufacturing companies in 
Nigeria has created an increasingly awarding of projects to these companies that intend to 
invest more in the manufacturing sector (Egbula and Zheng, 2011).  
“For Nigeria, incentives lie in China’s own successful economic transformation, 
its capacity to deliver large- scale infrastructure projects, and more importantly, 
its ability to finance them… China’s public and private enterprises are making 
forays into Nigeria’s manufacturing and information and communication 
technologies sectors” (ibid, p. 3). 
 
Although Egbula and Zheng (2011) believe that both countries could benefit from these 
investments, they believe stumbling blocks could impede that progress. Oyeranti et al 
(2011) go further to add that despite China’s ability to play a positive role in Nigeria’s 
economy, Chinese firms could cripple domestic contractors, because most contracts are 
awarded to Chinese firms, which in turn has an effect on local companies that creates 
disagreements and unemployment.  Oyeranti et al (2011) warn the Nigerian government 
against such actions. “Widespread contract awards to Chinese firms will cripple activities 
of domestic contractors” (ibid, p. 195). 
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Moreover, because most technical assistance is tied to utilizing Chinese inputs, 
Chinese experts and Chinese technology, there have been many concerns in Nigeria and 
elsewhere about the role of China in transferring technology and expertise to Nigerian 
firms (Amadasun, 2008). The concern is intensely growing, because some Chinese FDI 
concentrated in the trading sector has contributed to the establishment of Free Trade 
Zones (FTZs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Nigeria. Oyeranti et al (2010) posit 
that most FDIs from China into Nigeria are market seeking with a lack of linkage to 
Nigeria’s economy due to Chinese inputs and markets outlets.  
Oyeranti et al (2010) additionally analyze the different SEZs and their importance 
to China’s market seeking strategy. “In pursuit of practical evidence regarding impacts of 
Chinese FDI in Nigeria, five case studies were captured namely: Kajola Specialized 
Railway Industrial Zone, Ofada VEE tee rice Limited, and Ogun Guangdong Free Trade 
Zone, China Town in Lagos, and Lekki Free Trade Zone” (ibid, p. 2). They conclude by 
indicating that the different investments could bring growth to Nigeria, but 
inconveniences are still pervasive. 
These different SEZs would become a manufacturing industry for Chinese firms 
that will house approximately 100 firms (Davies, 2008). With the creation of FTZs and 
SEZs, there could potentially be more employments in Nigeria and growth in exports, but 
this is left with a lot of skepticism. Taylor (2007) observes that most of this skepticism 
comes as a result of past China’s actions in Nigeria. Most jobs have been lost in the past 
with China’s involvement in the manufacturing and constructing sectors, because most 
workers come from China, and reduce Nigeria’s employment growth. Thus, the 
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settlement of SEZs and FTZs in Nigeria does not necessarily mean employment 
generation in the oil country. 
Energy sector 
Nigeria is an oil producing and exporting country. Its oil is located in the area 
known as the Niger Delta in Nigeria. The Niger Delta is one sub- national minority area 
that forms a recurring decimal at the local, national and international political arena 
(Akpan and Akpabio, 2009). “The Niger Delta Region is the storehouse of Nigeria’s 
crude oil, which accounts for approximately ninety percent of the country’s revenue, 
providing more than ninety percent of total exports” (ibid, p. 10). Akpan and Akpabio 
(2009) note that the area referred to as the Niger Delta region houses the largest groups 
among the ethnic minorities spread over the south- south geographical zone of Nigeria, 
with a population of 7 million distributed in 1600 communities.  
“The region has some unique features… it is for instance, one of the largest 
wetlands in the world. It covers an area of 70,000 square kilometers and is noted 
for its sandy coastal ridge barriers, brackish or saline mangrove, fresh water, 
permanent and seasonal swamp forests as well as low land rainforests. The whole 
area is traversed and crisscrossed by a large number of rivers rivulets, streams, 
canals and creeks. The coastal line is buffeted throughout the year by the tides of 
the Atlantic Ocean while the mainland is subjected to regimes of flood by the 
various rivers particularly the River Niger. The Niger Delta Region is the second 
largest delta in the world and the largest wetlands in Africa” (ibid, p. 12). 
 
In addition, the region has become important due to increase violence and instability in 
the area as a result of demonstrations by local people against different oil companies 
operating in the region (Akpan and Akpabio, 2009). “Apart from manifest cases of 
violent conflicts, the general attitude of host communities is that of aggressiveness and 
confrontation” (ibid, p. 13). The authors identify most of the violence to be organized by 
militants and youths against oil companies operating in the region.  “Violence is targeted 
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at either oil companies in the region (through bombings of oil facilities or kidnappings of 
foreign oil workers) or the federal Government of Nigeria (threat of wars and 
kidnappings or killing of enforcement agents)” (ibid, p. 13). 
Akpan and Akpabio (2009) demonstrate that the Delta region has been 
continuously unstable for a long time due to violence and attacks as a sign of disapproval 
from locals to the continuous risks of drilling oil in the region. In their analysis of 
conflicts in the Delta region, Akpan and Akpabio (2009) explain that oil exploration and 
exploitation has had far reaching negative environmental, social, as well as economical 
impacts in the region. They related their analysis to habitants’ motives for attacking oil 
companies.  
The impact of oil activities in the region manifests in environmental degradation 
and pervasive poverty culminating in a sense of relative deprivation and a perception of 
alienation within host communities (Akpan and Akpabio, 2009). Therefore, the habitants 
of the region have always been against foreign oil companies’ activities in the delta, 
because they depend on the environment for daily living. One other main reason the 
authors believe militants have increased attacks against foreign oil companies and 
government workers, is their disappointment. Although the Delta Region is the richest in 
the region in terms of natural resources, Akpan and Akpabio (2009) posit that the region 
is threatened by environmental degradation and worse economic conditions, which has 
left the region under-developed. 
Okpo and Chukwuemeka (2012) expand on Akpan and Akpabio’s arguments 
(2009) to clarify that the operations of oil companies pose a serious problem to the 
environment. “The process of extracting and processing crude oil has caused much 
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pollution of the air, water and land. Fishing activities have been disturbed by oil spill 
accidents, which tend to occur rather frequently” (ibid, 14). In addition, oil companies in 
the area have participated in human rights abuses, which have cost the lives of many 
people (Okpo and Chukwuemeka, 2012). “Moreover, lives have been lost in fire 
explosions caused by spills and leakage of oil pipelines. In addition to wanton crisis and 
killing of the people while protesting against the injustices they receive” (ibid).  
This major crisis in the Delta was caused by one of Nigeria’s largest oil producer: 
Chevron. The oil company is one of the earliest that has been operating in the country, 
and it has invested a lot of money in oil and gas exploration. “Chevron is the third-largest 
oil producer in Nigeria and one of its largest investors, spending more than $3 billion 
annually” (Nigeria Fact Sheet: Chevron, 2012). The company has been operating in 
Nigeria for a long time, and has many assets in Nigeria’s oil. “The company operates 
under a joint-venture arrangement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and 
has assets on land, swamp and near-offshore concessions covering approximately 2.2 
million acres (8,900 sq km) in the Niger Delta region” (ibid, p. 1). 
 In Bustany and Wysham’s examinations of human rights abuses in the Niger 
Delta (2000), they trace Chevron’s activities and records as concerning. Bustany and 
Wysham (2000) indicate that Chevron was involved in two different incidents in Nigeria. 
The first one of them was the outcome of several attempts to discuss Chevron’s oil spills 
that had disrupted fresh water supplies and fishing grounds by the habitants of the delta 
region in 1998. After protesters to the conditions created by Chevron requested several 
meetings that were denied by the oil company, youth’s protesters refused to leave 
Chevron’s platform until a meeting was agreed upon (Bustany and Wysham, 2000). After 
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which Chevron never came, and requested assistance from Nigerian forces to stop the 
protests, which resulted in killings.  
     “In Chevron helicopters, the Nigerian Navy and Mobile Police—known as the “Kill 
‘n’ Go”—accompanied by Chevron personnel, fired upon the demonstrators, killing two 
people, Jolly Ogungbeje and Arolika Irowarinun, and seriously injuring two others” (ibid, 
p. 3). Although Chevron maintained that the protesters were trying to disarm the troops, 
the authors note that evidence demonstrates the opposite explaining that the youths were 
shot from the back. The second incident that Bustany and Wysham (2000) claim as being 
a strategy for clearing away villages in order for pipelines to continue along Chevron’s 
direct route was the destruction of a village.  
“On January 4, 1999, Opia and Ikenyan, two small communities of maybe 500 
people each in Delta State, Warri North local government area, were attacked by 
about 100 armed soldiers –who also arrived in Chevron-owned vessels… as the 
helicopter approached the village it started firing at them. After staying about half 
an hour at Opia, the helicopter flew to nearby Ikenyan and fired at the villagers” 
(ibid, p. 4). 
 
There were also killings of other dozen people, along with kidnappings and 
destructions of houses (Bustany and Wysham, 2000). “Forty-seven people from Ikenyan 
community and fifteen from Opia and are still missing… The soldiers also set fire to the 
homes before they left, destroying most of the community” (ibid, p. 3). As a result of 
these actions, Chevron’s relationship with Nigeria has been somewhat controversial, and 
Nigeria has tried to open partnership with other countries such as China and their oil 
companies for trade as a way of getting more leverage and opportunities for the best 
deals. 
China’s engagements with Nigeria extended to the oil industry overtime. Despite 
that China’s motives are somewhat controversial, its activities and actions in the Niger 
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Delta region has been problematic for Nigeria’s goals. Firstly, China’s entry into 
Nigeria’s oil sector set the stage for a corrupted and patronage system for gaining access 
to oil. Furthermore, apart from corruption and patronage, deep environmental 
degradation, overreliance on oil commodity, lack of diversification and the resource curse 
are potential problems that are arising from China’s transactions into the oil zone. 
Oil was a big factor in the development of relations between both countries. In his 
analysis, Taylor (2007) notes “China was completely kept out of Nigeria’s oil industry by 
Western companies with an established presence in Nigeria, but this changed rapidly 
through a mix of canny diplomacy and sweetener deals, often unrelated to the actual oil 
industry” (ibid, p. 636). China’s promise to build and launch a telecommunications 
satellite for Nigeria is one of the many examples, where Beijing is able to build projects 
to get oil contracts (Taylor, 2007). Moreover, the Nigerian government, which also 
helped China to invest in the oil sector, contributed to China’s high engagement in the 
extractive sector. Salter’s research of China’s entry into the oil sector (2009) indicates 
“Even so, it apparently took persistent lobbying from Obasanjo to tempt Chinese oil 
companies into Nigeria — so great were their concerns about insecurity in the Niger 
Delta and Western companies’ dominance in the country’s oil sector” (ibid, p. 11).     
Obasanjo had to offer illegal deals and promises before Asian oil companies 
invested in Nigeria’s oil. “Obasanjo offered Chinese companies the right of first refusal 
(RFR) on oil blocs at discounted rates or with signature bonus waivers, in return for their 
commitment to invest in downstream and infrastructure projects” (ibid, p. 11). 
Additionally, Obi (2008) found that the main reason for opening the oil sector to China 
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was because; Nigeria wanted to increase oil revenues (Vines et al., 2009; Mthembu- 
Salter, 2009).  
 “On the part of the Nigerian faction of the transnational capitalist elite and 
President Obasanjo’s government, the invitation to the Chinese was part of an effort to 
broaden the global base of oil accumulation in the Niger Delta” (ibid, p. 148). Besides, 
increasing oil revenues, the most important factor in reaching out to Asian National Oil 
Companies (ANOCs) was to leverage it’s bargaining power. “It also wanted to increase 
oil revenues and leverages its bargaining power over the various western oil companies 
and foreign state oil corporations that dominate the Nigerian oil industry, and are 
struggling for increased access to the strategic oil resources of the Niger Delta region” 
(ibid, p. 418). 
By gaining such an advantage, Chinese companies were able to extract and win 
big oil contracts from Nigeria, by building infrastructure for the country, while expanding 
the role of their companies in Nigeria at the same time. Taylor’s investigation of China’s 
investment in Nigeria’s energy sector (2007) indicates that China’s ability to build up 
goodwill projects in the telecommunications sectors played out in granting oil contracts 
to China. “With regard to specific Chinese oil contracts in Nigeria, in December 2004 the 
state-owned Chinese oil company Sinopec and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) signed an agreement to develop Oil Mining Lease (OML) 64 and 66 in the Niger 
Delta” (ibid, p. 636). 
Different oil contracts were also given to China as a result of Obasanjo’s policy of  
“oil for infrastructure”. Building on such development, in 2006 the Nigerian government 
offered China four oil exploration licenses in exchange for $4 billion worth of investment 
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in Nigeria’s infrastructure. Prior to bidding auctions for wining oil contracts, Vines et al 
(2009) imply that President Obasanjo had entered into strategic deals with Asian 
companies, offering them lucrative blocks in return for investments. “Prior to the auction, 
President Obasanjo had entered into strategic deals with South korea, Taiwan, China, 
India most recently Malaysia, offering them lucrative blocks in return for the promise of 
strategic investments” (ibid, p. 14). 
The auctions led to different fraud oil licensing rounds that took place during 
Obasanjo’s term to secure oil bids (Vines et al., 2009). The 2000, 2005, 2006 and 2007 
licensing rounds were all organized in an attempt to get several deals by playing 
companies against one another to gain the biggest investment. Vines et al (2009) 
additionally argue that the main reason for such action was because the president wanted 
investments in return for allowing foreign oil companies take oil from Nigeria. For so 
long, Shell and Exxon have been operating in Nigeria, and the country hasn’t gained 
much from these operations in its infrastructure and development, therefore these deals 
were portrayed as an opportunity for Nigeria to gain access to what it has been deprived 
of (Vines et al., 2009; Mthembu- Salter, 2009). “By early 2008, President Obasanjo was 
reportedly ‘fed up with the Shells and Exxon that had repeatedly declined to build new 
refineries, on grounds of cost, or to otherwise invest in job-creating projects outside their 
core business” (Vines et al., 2009, p. 14).   
The president felt that Nigeria was just an exploitation destination for western oil 
companies that did nothing in return for the country. “There was a growing sense that the 
IOCs came only to exploit Nigeria and gave little back in return” (ibid, p. 14). The deals 
signed and agreed upon were not applauded everywhere in the country. Chinese oil 
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companies were not welcomed in the Delta Region, because of the increased risk of 
extraction and environmental degradation that resulted from these contracts (Taylor, 
2007; Akpan and Akpabio, 2009; Courson, 2011; Obi, 2008). 
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) warned Chinese 
companies to stay clear of the Niger Delta (Taylor, 2007; Akpan and Akpabio, 2009; 
Courson, 2011; Obi, 2008). “Nigerian militants from the Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND) warned Chinese companies to ‘stay well clear’ of the Niger 
Delta or risk facing attack” (Taylor, 2007, p. 636). In his article, Taylor (2007) observes 
that after oil contracts were signed between China and Nigeria, MEND militants sent out 
threats to Chinese investments in the region’s oil, and in early 2006, militants began 
attacking oil installations and kidnapping oil workers. “MEND also claimed 
responsibility for a car bomb attack near the port town of Warri, stating that the blast was 
‘a warning against Chinese expansion in the region’, adding that ‘The Chinese 
government by investing in stolen crude places its citizens in our line of fire’” (ibid). 
Taylor (2007) explicates that several kidnappings and killings actually took place after 
the threats. Taylor (2007) attributes all these actions to discontents from locals, which 
had an effect on Chinese companies (Akpan and Akpabio, 2009; Courson, 2011; Obi, 
2008).  
The violence in the Delta region was not the only challenge Chinese oil 
companies faced for gaining oil operations in Nigeria. After the change of regimes in 
2007, “oil for infrastructure” was no longer viewed as the best policy in Nigeria. 
Mthembu-Salter (2009) states in his article that when President Ya’Ardua took office in 
2007, most projects that were signed during Obasanjo’s term were either cancelled or 
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suspended for investigation, because of the irregularities in the bidding process. 
“Yar’Adua’s administration swiftly launched reviews of all the ‘oil for infrastructure’ 
agreements signed between the Nigerian government and Asian oil companies, which 
have mostly resulted either in the suspension or cancellation of these contracts” (ibid, p. 
8).  
Ya’Ardua’s regime did not view “oil for infrastructure” as the best strategy to 
gain investments. Vines et al (2009) go further to add that Ya’Ardua was more skeptics, 
and not sure that most of the infrastructure paid by oil will actually be constructed. Some 
of these believes were not wrong, because in his analysis of China’s investment in 
Nigeria’s energy sector, Taylor (2007) states that many contracts were signed, but some 
of the projects never began, because some of these projects were signed as a pre-
condition to wining oil blocks that Chinese companies were bidding for. “The 
arrangement which was tied to oil block allocation as a result of the peculiar nature of the 
refinery, which requires heavy investment, was being considered for review as the 
Chinese firm had not shown appreciable interest” (ibid, p. 637). These oil blocks were 
not given to Chinese companies when most projects were suspended by the new regime, 
but the new policy only worsened China’s exposure to the oil sector in Nigeria.  
China’s oil companies suffered from the suspension of these contracts, because 
some of them had invested in these projects, but the new agreements proposed by 
Ya’Ardua was more pleasant than the old ones (Mthembu- Salter, 2009; Vines et al., 
2009). Mthembu- Salter (2009) argues that Ya’Ardua’s policy, which was now “oil for 
cash”, boosted China’s exposure to the oil sector in Nigeria. For example, Mthembu- 
Salter (2009) mentions that in 2009 China’s Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
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(Sinopec) purchased Canada’s Addax Petroleum for $7.2 billion, which will only 
increase China’s power in the Nigerian oil sector. Mthembu- Salter (2009) implies that 
increased investments in the oil sector will impact Nigeria negatively, because most of its 
revenue already depends on oil (Taylor, 2006; Amadasun, 2008; Zhao, 2007; Zafar, 
2007). And, a big concern about China’s role in Africa as well as in Nigeria is its 
increasing role in the extractive sectors.  
 Zhao (2007) discusses China’s quest for oil in the world, and its entry into 
African oil. Zhao (2007) argues that although China’s investments has been diversified to 
many other sectors of the economy, its major investments has been in the energy sector 
by placing it self as a long term partner in the oil sectors of most countries, to create a 
level of interdependence. “China’s goal is to create a level of economic interdependence 
that will lead to greater trade, including the purchase of oil and gas supplies” (ibid, p. 
406).        
 Zhao (2007) demonstrates that China’s program of integrating it self in the 
market are all strategies for oil exports. “Strategically, these endeavors are meant to 
reinforce Beijing’s efforts at establishing itself in Africa as a desirable long-term 
customer for the continent’s oil exports” (ibid, p. 406). Zafar (2007) undertook the 
analysis of China’s impact on the continent and posits that China’s foreign policy is being 
increasingly driven by its domestic development strategy and its need for resources. 
Zafar’s analysis (2007) leads him to justify that China’s strategy of oil imports from 
Africa can increase extraction as well as no human development or diversified economy 
for oil rich countries.  
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 “There is a risk that this new relationship between developing countries will be 
one of resource extraction and that human capital development may be neglected” (ibid, 
p. 121). Zafar (2007) explicates that diversified economies are potential winners in this 
partnership, but countries such as Nigeria with a concentrated income from the oil sector 
can suffer from the “Dutch Disease” (reliance over natural resources commodity). “Third, 
the supply shock to world manufacturing… and the growing imports of cheap Chinese 
goods in Africa, coupled with increasing competition between Chinese and African 
textiles in third-country… threaten to hinder economic diversification in Africa and 
contribute to deindustrialization” (ibid, p. 126). And, this risk is apparent in Nigeria. 
Debt 
China’s role in reducing African countries’ debt has increasingly become a 
concern to many countries. China has distanced it self from traditional donors, and placed 
itself as the best partner, by creating an aid package that is hard to resist by African 
leaders. Additionally, China’s aid programs had made it difficult to differentiate between 
aid and loans. Its debt and aid assistance to maintain a foothold in Nigeria’s economy is a 
consequence of its overall strategy. China is increasing Nigeria’s willingness to borrow 
while benefiting from the terms of loan contracts. Its funding and loans produces bad 
results to Nigeria. The results of the “tied aid” and loans result to: corruption, lack of 
transparency, impact on debt ratio, reliance on oil, and lack of accountability in 
government’s funds. 
China has used loans and debt relief to assist Nigeria as well as other African 
countries. However, China’s assistance is somewhat problematic to Nigeria. In Eisenman 
and Kurlantzick’s article of China’s strategy in Africa (2006), the authors argue that debt 
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relief has not only been an important strategy for China to keep a stronghold in Nigeria, 
but it has created a cycle among the two countries. Because countries try to build and 
invest in different projects that cannot be paid for, Beijing places itself as a good donor 
(Eisenman and Kurlantzick, 2006). “Debt relief has been an excellent public relations 
tool for Beijing because it not only garners popular support but also allows for two 
positive press events: the first to provide the loan, the second to relieve the debt” (ibid, p. 
221). Beijing provides loans to these countries, and when the loans are not paid, or cannot 
be paid it transforms it into debt relief, by effectively turning loans into grants. Such 
method allows for the continuous cycle of keeping African countries including Nigeria in 
a borrowing state that benefits China. 
Oyeranti et al (2011) illustrate other methods through which debt is accumulated 
by Nigeria that is dangerous for the country. Oyeranti et al (2011) argue that through 
Chinese financing and loans for contracts awarded to Chinese firms, Chinese firms 
benefit from the contracts, while Nigeria uses the loan to accumulate debt for the country. 
Oyeranti et al (2011) warn the Nigerian government to further investigate cost analysis of 
their projects so that the contracts awarded to Chinese firms are awarded at a minimum 
cost. The debt accumulation that is apparent by the Nigerian government in different 
sectors is also featured in the oil sector. Despite the cancellations of “oil for 
infrastructure” deals, Chinese companies have been extensively growing in Nigeria, and 
benefiting from different Nigerian contracts (Mthembu- Salter, 2009). The growing 
ability to win contracts has allowed a significant increase of Chinese companies in 
Nigeria that gain most contracts. 
“The largest Chinese construction company in Nigeria, and, it is claimed, the 
second largest of any origin, 96 is CCECC… One of CCECC’s first Nigerian 
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projects was a $4.8 million, 71 kilometre rehabilitation of the Papalanto–Lagos 
expressway in 2000–01,97, which was followed by a much more substantial 
contract, a $50.5 million, 5 000 unit athletes’ village for the eighth annual All-
Africa Games in Abuja, which was completed in August 2003. 98 CCECC 
rehabilitated the Ikot Akpaden–Okoroette road in 2003–04 for $5.7 million, 99 
built a new $16.7 million corporate headquarters for the Nigerian 
Communications Commission in Abuja in 2003–05,100 and is the main 
construction company at the Lekki Free Trade Zone near Lagos” (ibid, p. 16). 
 
According to Mthembu- Salter (2009) another prominent company that gets 
Nigerian contracts is the Geo- Engineering Company (CGC). It has been involved in a 
substantial number of projects, and is one of the biggest African operators settled in 
Nigeria as well. 
“CGC has branched out from construction and is also involved in oil exportation 
for its major shareholder, Sinopec. CGC has no formal corporate social 
responsibility programme, but does apparently drill boreholes free of charge in 
impoverished communities at the behest of the government, and has started a 
model farm in Kebi State. CGC has more than 200 Chinese staff in Nigeria, which 
is the company’s biggest African operation” (ibid, p. 17). 
 
In his article, Mthembu- Salter (2009) observes that during the “oil for 
infrastructure” policy, it was easier for Nigeria to debt-fund its infrastructure and pay 
some of its loans through oil and “tied aid”, but with the new “oil for cash” policy, the 
debt accumulation and repayment will be different, which can pose a problem to Nigeria. 
The new policy can be problematic, because it will increase corruption, since cash has 
had a tendency to disappear with Nigerian leaders (Taylor, 2006). “Regimes that benefit 
from oil receipts are not controlled by a need to generate revenues through taxation and 
are thus more easily tempted to sideline calls for accountability to or even participation in 
government” (ibid, p. 956). Taylor (2006) also mentions that oil money has rarely gone 
towards development, which makes any attempt of revenue generation hard and 
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consequently deepens debt in African countries. Thus, China’s investments in the 
different sectors of the economy play a role on the debt state of Nigeria.  
Reisen and Ndoye’s research on China’s role in African countries debt (2008) add 
a new approach to ways in which debt impacts the country. Through their study, Reisen 
and Ndoye (2008) assume that because China has an impact on debt ratio through 
stimulation of export and growth, it creates a negative effect in the reduction of product 
diversification, since countries tend to export the demanding product, which in this case 
is oil. By demanding and exporting energy commodities, Nigeria’s export rises, while its 
reliance on its natural resources increases. “Africa’s trade reorientation toward China 
may also imply an important drawback: it may derail endeavors by African commodity 
producers to diversify away from traditional export” (ibid, p. 38). 
Gaps in the literature 
It is clear from the literature that the state’s goal will be hard to implement. 
Researchers have shown that NEEDS is firstly structured inappropriately, and there is an 
agenda that hasn’t been created to achieve the aspirations Nigeria wants. Moreover, it is 
also clear that China’s effect on Nigeria’s trade, oil and debt are diverse. On the one 
hand, studies show that China has invested a lot in the development of Nigeria’s 
infrastructure, economic zones and important projects while building its own industry and 
business in Nigeria, and on the other hand studies also demonstrate that these actions 
have resulted to consequences that have not been appraised in Nigeria. Despite evidences 
from authors, there are many holes in the literature that are important.  
Authors demonstrate that NEEDS is hard to implement presenting several reasons 
for the state’s inability to achieve the goals. Nevertheless, there is no research on 
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government’s attempts to create a framework to implement NEEDS. There is no evidence 
demonstrating if any of these objectives has tried to be achieved by the state. Researchers 
also fail to assume or analyze if there are other factors that hinder the state’s trial in 
implementing NEEDS. Other factors that might be an obstacle to implement NEEDS 
such as foreign donors, and investors that have shaped and are still shaping Nigeria’s 
policies and development programs have been ignored. Studies have failed to include 
external elements in their analysis of NEEDS’ ability to be implemented pre-supposing 
that it is a result of past governments’ lack of effectiveness and the established patronage 
system of the state. 
Different investigations of China’s relations with Nigeria, and involvements in 
Nigeria’s trade, oil and debt sector did not include important factors that have an impact 
on the relations. Interpretations from China’s engagements in Nigeria’s trade sector have 
excluded other local factors that have resulted to an increase of China’s imports into 
Nigeria. Authors attributed increased imports, smuggling, black markets, and de-
industrialization to China’s effects on Nigeria without an analysis of the country’s 
statistics and realities before China became a major importer. There was also no ability to 
investigate if the outcomes of the relations and investments in the different sectors might 
generate other positive factors for Nigeria on the long term, and the kind of results that 
could evolve. An important factor that has been left out is if China’s investments are 
actually a result of what Nigeria is hoping for, or if some outcomes of this partnership 
align with some of Nigeria’s goals.   
There is, therefore, an implied causality and directionality in these analyses. 
Authors approach the relation by relying on the assumptions that China’s involvement in 
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these different sectors has led to the outcomes perceived in Nigeria, or that it will be in 
the future. Some analyses rely on the events that have risen in the past with other partners 
and in other countries’ relationship with China. 
My approach, while recognizing these gaps is not wholly apart from them. My 
analysis will build on existing studies on the evaluation of NEEDS implementation and 
outcomes of China’s involvement in these sectors. Through authors’ opinions and 
arguments on the different themes, the goal is to demonstrate that China’s investments 
are mostly for the benefits of the Chinese economy, leaving Nigeria with several issues in 
the trade, oil, and debt sectors that impact some of Nigeria’s developmental aspirations. 
While previous studies examine only the actions and outcomes of the relation, this 
analysis will consider Nigeria’s goals which structures a stronger conclusion of NEEDS 
inability to be implemented and China’s effect in Nigeria. The goal is to link the different 
aspects discussed above to NEEDS, and analyze if they complement each other or differ 
from one another. 
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Chapter III: Methodology 
 
This paper is qualitative in nature. The “data” collected is a combination of 
primary documents, newspaper articles, working papers, reports, and historical analysis. 
The different sources are framed with theories discussed above to explain how 
problematic NEEDS is hard to implement, and how China’s investment is diverting from 
NEEDS. 
Method of research: Textual Analysis 
Previous related studies involving China and Africa relations about financial aid, 
investments, debt relief, infrastructure finance, trade, and oil; were used. A narrower 
focus was then geared towards a specific nation in sub-Saharan Africa to maximize China 
relations with Africa. Departing from an economic growth framework, I built upon my 
argument reading and analyzing texts from Nigeria’s development plans and programs. 
Finally, I searched for primary documents, and newspaper accounts that had recent 
information on China’s involvement in Nigeria to fill in some of the gaps missing from 
the relations’ historical record.  
Methodology 
Gathered information from published journals, research papers, newspaper 
articles, and other various sources were important to this project. Each text contributes to 
an entire understanding of the Sino- Nigerian relations. Moreover, the different texts 
approached the relations in differing manners. Primary documents (i.e. books and 
scholarly articles) discussed the importance of NEEDS and problems related to its 
implementation. It also analyzed the evolvement of the Sino- Nigerian relations as well as 
the challenges and opportunities apparent in the relations. Newspaper articles covered the 
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relations as well, but with an emphasis on the current issues arising from the partnership. 
As stated earlier, the goal of this thesis is to provide a thorough analysis of the Sino- 
Nigerian relations in order to better understand the effects of China’s involvement on 
Nigeria’s objectives.  
The following pages will present secondary source data on the relations. The first 
section presents a critical analysis on the implementation of NEEDS and the different 
obstacles the Nigerian government faces for its success. The content of the following 
sections varies from major themes to particular problems around Chinese involvement in 
Nigeria, with a wide range of secondary source documents and few newspaper articles. 
The texts selection compiles information of Chinese investments in Nigeria’s trade, oil 
and debt sector as they pertain to the topic in question. 
The documents used are to identify the issues arising from China’s engagements 
in these three sectors. Of interest are the ways the outcomes of China’s involvement in 
these three sectors has an impact on Nigeria’s developmental goals, and the consequences 
of the outcomes of these actions when this partnership contrast with local realities.  An 
innate limitation of this study is in the interpretation of my data and research, because 
there might be counter factors that hinder the implementation of NEEDS, and impact the 
outcomes of the relation between both countries. The paper is written in a thematic 
fashion designed to present the relations in an evolving manner.  
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Chapter IV: Data Analysis and Discussion of Findings 
 
Achieving Nigeria’s goals 
This portion discusses the obstacles Nigeria faces in implementing NEEDS, and 
the strategies for the success of NEEDS in Nigeria. 
Barriers to implementation 
Nigeria’s experience has been one of formulating good plans, policies, programs, 
and projects and then failing to achieve objectives because of ineffective 
implementation—or no implementation. NEEDS is among its numerous plans and 
programs that are unrealistic and unachievable. For NEEDS to be successful and 
achieved, there needs to be effective implementation of the program in the country.  
Implementation defines the process, institutional framework, and instruments for 
translating aspirations, goals, and programs into action and concrete results. 
Implementing NEEDS calls for commitment, discipline, and a strong will to stay the 
course of reforms—at all levels, from the President and federal executive branch down to 
the grassroots. Critical to the success of NEEDS is an effective institutional framework, 
particularly a public service dedicated to excellence and efficiency and supportive of 
reforms. The pillars of Nigeria’s success in implementing the goals and objectives 
outlined in NEEDS are inexistent.  
The government cannot achieve the professed objectives of NEEDS due to weak 
management and corruption (Onyenekenwa Eneh, 2011, p. 66).  
“All development visions and programs fail in Nigeria because of poor handling 
by corrupt and poor/hungry politicians/ bureaucrats, leading to growing poverty 
symptoms, including electoral frauds; untrue and inefficient representatives; 
violence: religious crises, crises in the Middle belt and Niger Delta regions, 
hostage taking and cult; food insecurity, low agricultural production, illiteracy 
that weakens democracy; crime; high mortality; and morbidity rates; prostitution 
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and poor health and national image; low GDP and GNP and high unemployment 
rate” (ibid). 
 
The methods described in the states’ objectives for attaining these goals are 
improbable. The government failed to create an agenda to address some of the goals 
mentioned. NEEDS only suggests what the government should do. It merely identifies 
the problems and their causes, without providing realistic solutions to target these goals 
(Paul Adogamhe, 2010, p. 65). Some of the approaches taken in the charter do not 
identify the poor majority of the population. There are strategic errors such as the 
omission of representations that undermines the recovery plan (Adogamhe, 2010, p. 58). 
In its efforts to provide education and jobs, the government created an economic class of 
educated but unemployed Nigerians, because the number of civil service positions did not 
expand as the pool for qualified candidates, which has failed to be addressed in NEEDS 
(Adogambe, 2010, p. 59). NEEDS admits that the system is bad, but fails to create a 
strategy to change the system rather than improving it. 
  “Like every aspect of the NEEDS manifesto, the strategies fall short of making 
the suggested solutions do-able… A second grievous omission was the government 
failure to recognize the ineffectiveness of the current political structure” (ibid, p. 66). 
There is an absence of mechanism in Nigeria to facilitate the objectives created in 
NEEDS as a result of gross inefficiency, mismanagement, project duplication, corruption, 
lack of accountability, and government mismanagement. An example is the absence of a 
stable and appropriate fund allocated for some of its plan, in regards to the poor 
population (Ikeanyibe Marcellus, 2009). “ Evidence has shown that not much has been 
done by various schemes of the program to eradicate poverty, as funds allocated are too 
small to create any significant impact in addition of militating problems” (ibid, p. 205). In 
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fact there were reported cases of misappropriation and diversion of budgetary allocations 
that are meant to efficiently tackle some of the challenges of poverty in the country 
(Barnes Anger, 2010). “By and large, the poverty reduction or alleviation program of the 
government via the instrumentality of NEEDS has failed because of corruption and 
misappropriation of funds that are meant to carry out the program” (ibid, p. 141).   
Engaging Nigeria 
Implementation of a viable plan requires that the federal government focuses its 
attention on the target population to make sound investments that will benefit and raise 
incomes, examine the sectors and occupations where there should be more investments, 
promote industrial training, creativity in schools, and improve the skills of the self- 
employed (Paul Adogamhe, 2010). Creating creativity in schools will lead to bold socio-
economic experiments that will address some of the problems the country faces. 
Teaching and improving skills would have helped the educational strategy designed by 
NEEDS to be adequate (Adogamhe, 2010: p. 61). For NEEDS to be implemented 
successfully, it requires that the government commits, eliminates obstacles for the 
creation of a transparent system, and have an effective leader to manage the government 
(Abdu Ja’Afaru Bambale, 2011, p. 22). There needs to be reforms that will remain at the 
level of Nigeria’s leadership where the political will and considerations will not be 
lacking for implementing successful policies (Bambale, 2011, p. 22). 
Unfortunately, corruption in Nigeria hinders any good development dream, 
visions and policies as a result of poor handling, untrue and inefficient representatives, 
patronage, ineffectiveness and lack of willingness for change. Reno (1999) relates these 
aspects to “warlord politics”, where corruption and patronage are at the heart of the 
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government, than other priorities. The Nigerian government has continuously failed to 
play its role and take responsibility for its population. The nation’s underdevelopment is 
associated with weak management and corruption for the pursuit of elites’ wealth. 
Amalgamating the state’s funds for wealth creation rather than implementing effective 
policies has been the priorities of governments in Nigeria.  Therefore, due to a lack of 
coordination and commitment, lack of continuity, policy inconsistency, deficient 
infrastructural facilities and corruption, NEEDS will only a be dream for Nigeria’s 
development goals if effective leadership does not exist and corruption does not decrease. 
 
 
China’s Trade and investment in Nigeria 
This section covers China- Nigeria trade and investments with an emphasis on (1) 
bilateral trade relations between both countries; (2) China’s de-industrialization policy to 
promote the prosperity of the Chinese economy; (3) China’s investments in the different 
free trade zones established in Nigeria, perpetuating its tactics for increasing trade and 
establishing its industries in Nigeria; and (4) a summary of the consequences of China’s 
role as the leader of commerce in Nigeria.  
Bilateral Trade Relations 
Trade relations between China and Nigeria have differed from Nigeria’s trade 
relations with other countries. China has been able to dominate the market and place it 
self as the largest trading partner in Nigeria today. China’s foreign policy and strategy 
allows it to have an easy access to products and markets that displace other competitors 
and makes China more appealing as a trading partner. China’s trade and investment in 
Nigeria has resulted to the numerous outcomes discussed below. 
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1. Trade Imbalance 
Trade relations between Nigeria and China began in 1972 with an economic and 
technical cooperation that included trade (Alaba Ogunsawo, 2008, p. 192). This 
cooperation was unique because it was open ended and allowed an unlimited number of 
projects Nigeria could request from China (Ogunsawo, 2008, p. 192).  Between 1972 and 
1974, Nigeria as well as China’s exports totaled millions of dollars and therefore 
heightened in the following years. “In 1975 and 1976, Nigerian imports from China 
totaled US $69.86 million and US$140.87 million respectively, while Nigeria’s exports to 
China for these combined years amounted to US$11.8 million” (ibid, p. 192). By 1995, 
bilateral trade has doubled to $210 million, and climbed $830 million by 2000 (Gregory 
Mthembu- Salter, 2009, p. 11). The disparity in the Sino- Nigerian trade was vast, and it 
became a concern to the Nigerian government. Although Nigerian exports to China 
increased from $60 million in 1995 to $293 million in 2000, the terms of trade favored 
China with exports of 73% in the bilateral trade and 68% in 2000 (Mthembu- Salter, 
2009, p. 11). The adverse trade imbalance only worsened over time, because by 2008 it 
was worth $7.3 billion with Chinese exports representing 93% of the bilateral trade (see 
table 1). 
Table 1: Nigeria–China bilateral trade, 2001–08 ($ millions) 
Year Nigeria's 
exports to 
China 
China's exports 
to Nigeria 
Bilateral trade 
value 
China's 
exports/total 
(%) 
2001 227.4 917.2 1144.6 80.1 
2002 121.3 1047.1 1168.4 89.6 
2003 71.7 1787.5 1859.2 96.1 
2004 462.6 1719.3 2181.9 78.8 
2005 527.1 2305.3 2832.4 81.4 
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exports to China are oil products, whereas China has a variety of goods exported to 
Nigeria (Mthembu- Salter, 2009, p. 11). Most of Chinese exports to Nigeria were 
machinery and transport equipment, textiles, apparel, footwear, manufactured materials, 
agricultural raw products, electronics, and parts (see figure 1). The trade imbalance has 
resulted to a significant amount of problems in Nigeria. 
“Nigerian trade unions have been reported as blaming Chinese imports for the 
loss of jobs of 350,000 Nigerian manufacturing jobs, chiefly in the textile sector, 
and Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa are
three countries in SSA countries where employment and domestic production 
have been negatively impacted by Chinese imports” (ibid).
 
Figure 1: China’s exports to Nigeria by product, 2010
 Source: UN Comtrade, http://comtrade.un.org
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The intensity of China’s export has multiplied overtime, and China has exported beyond 
what it was expected to export to Nigeria (Adeolu Adewuyi et al., 2010, p. 91). “This 
development is traceable to economic growth recorded by Nigeria and the need to 
demand for more manufactured products from China in order to facilitate industrial 
activities in Nigeria” (ibid, p. 91).  
Nigeria’s export to China is not diverse like its imports from China. Products 
exported to China are spread over food, animal, crude materials, oils, chemical products, 
and manufactured goods (Adewuyi et al., 2010, p. 15). But, mineral fuel and lubricants 
constitute a higher percentage of exports to China due to their significance (see figure 2). 
Because the main imports to China are mineral and affiliated products, most of the gains 
go to the government and oil companies (Adewuyi et al., 2010, p. 17). Therefore 
Nigeria’s exports to China do not directly benefit Nigerians, and may be generated 
through government spending on services for the country (Adewuyi et al., 2010, p. 17). 
Considering that exports to China do not have any direct impact on local markets, it does 
not directly affect Nigerians or the economy, because oil money has been hardly used for 
services or towards Nigerians’ benefits. On the other hand, imports from China have not 
had same results on the economy or on Nigerians. 
Figure 2: China’s imports from Nigeria by product, 2010 
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Source: UN Comtrade, http://comtrade.un.org
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2.  Black markets and Illegal goods 
Benin, which has the closest boarder to Nigeria, has been reported as an area 
where a significant amount of goods are smuggled into Nigeria (Mthembu- Salter, 2009, 
p. 11). The density of this traffic has created an enterprise at both sides of the border, 
which is eased with corrupt officials on both sides that allow entry of goods after getting 
a bribe. Because of issues such as tax and the black market, it is hard to keep real figures 
of the trade between both countries (Mthembu- Salter, 2009, p. 11). The black market 
also poses a great deal of problems in the trade relations due to constant smuggling and 
illegal Chinatowns. Smuggling of goods through borders and bribery from customs has 
increased and affected local markets.  
“In February 2006, the Nigerian Custom Department decried ‘gross violation of 
Nigeria’s import and export regulations by Chinese traders in various towns’. The 
customs departments also cited a case of thirty trailer loads of contraband goods 
imported into the country under mysterious circumstances by Chinese businesses, 
and their Nigerian collaborators” (Obiorah et al., 2008, p. 280).  
 
This has affected local markets that had to lose, and led to the arrest of several Chinese 
people involved (Obiorah et al., 2008, p. 280). 
As a result of the high density of imports and illegal goods, Nigeria’s market now 
habits what is known as Chinatowns. Chinatowns have become popular, because of their 
commercial activities that have affected local markets, and their increased criticisms by 
local producers. It has become a place of public concern where Chinese men and women 
participate in the retail trade or commercial activities (Ogunsawo, 2008, p. 202). “The 
mushrooming of what are called ‘illegal Chinatowns’, where goods are sold without 
passing through Nigerian customs service checkpoints” (ibid, p. 202). 
3. China Town in Lagos 
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China Town in Lagos is a shopping area also known as a trading zone, where 
Chinese enterprises operate. International Cooperation Industry Nigeria Limited manages 
the market with its office located at Surulere area of the state (Olugboyega Oyeranti et 
al., 2010, p. 61). The introduction of preferential textile quotas for Africa under the 
African Growth Opportunities Act (AGOA) encouraged Chinese firms to form trading 
operations in Nigeria and exploit the opportunities offered by AGOA under the American 
government (Sola Akinrinade and Olukoya Ogen, 2008, p. 166). AGOAs preferential 
textile quota for Africa was one of the basic reasons for establishing Chinatown 
(Akinrinade & Ogen, 2008, p. 166). Local designs are fraudulently copied and taken to 
China for mass production. Thus, fabrics from “China come in with stolen Nigerian 
labels and designs for distribution in Nigeria as well as to re-export them to the United 
States in order to derive optimum benefit from the US preferential textile quota for 
Africa” (ibid, p. 166). 
 The market consists of 120 shops, with a 75% owned by the Chinese, with an 
average of two Nigerians engaged as shop attendants. Traders in the market deal in 
products such as textiles and apparels, lace materials, baby wears and toys, foot-wears, 
handbags, household utensils, personal effects, items for decorations, electrical 
appliances, art works, among others. These are light manufactures. Investigation shows 
that Chinese firms in Nigeria produce some of the products sold, while majority of them 
are imported from China (Oyeranti et al., 2010, p. 61). The market receives daily, 
relatively high potential participants with various missions. “Other participants in the 
market are the transporters, food sellers and the market management. There is a branch of 
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the Intercontinental Bank (PLC.) at the market and this is expected to facilitate financial 
transactions of the market participants” (ibid, p. 61).  
Illegal goods, Chinatowns, black markets and imbalance of trade are all results of 
Chinese imports to Nigeria, and it has affected local markets, as well as other sectors. 
Because most imports from China are finished goods, they compete with Nigeria’s 
domestic manufacturing sectors, and the imports constitute a leakage to the economy 
(Adewuyi et al., 2010, p. 8). This has resulted to contradictory trade relations between 
both countries as imports have a negative impact on national income. Nigeria’s imports 
from China also play a double role, as these imports have also led to some growth due to 
the high consumption of the goods. High consumption increases demand, which in turn 
heightens the imports from China. But, as imports play a positive role in the country’s 
economic growth, so does it affect the country negatively. 
 “Ideally, Nigerian consumers and government should gain from imports from 
China while Nigerian producers and workers should lose particularly if most of 
the imports are import- competing final products since this implies the market 
share of Nigerian producers would shrink and lead to excess capacity and 
shedding of workers” (ibid, p. 13).  
 
4. China’s de- industrialization policy and its effects in Nigeria 
The market and the economy have not being the only areas hit by imports from 
China, but so did unemployment. Unemployment plays an important part in risen 
concerns from Nigerians. China has been so successful in its trade relations that its ‘going 
global’ policy has aided it to settle in Nigerian markets. “China has done so successfully: 
more than 100 Chinese companies now operate in Nigeria in various fields, from 
construction, to agriculture to water and oil” (Ogunsawo, 2008, p. 200). Nigeria has 
proven to be an ideal location for Chinese companies, due to a large consuming 
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population looking for cheap products, and a failed industrialized economy with 
availability of space for business opportunities. See Table 1 for major Chinese companies 
in Nigeria. The settlement of Chinese companies in Nigeria doesn’t prove to be so ideal 
for Nigerians. Despite that Nigeria’s industry and manufacturing companies have been 
unproductive due to lack of management, and inefficient policies, Chinese companies 
have made the situation worse. China’s trading policy has been unfavorable to the 
Nigerian industry. Its policy has been driven de-industrialization in Nigeria (Akinrinade 
& Ogen, 2008, p. 165).  
 
Table 1: Major Chinese companies in Nigeria 
Companies Sector of 
activities 
Assets (USD 
billion) 
Employees Investments in 
Nigeria 
SEPCO Electric power 
construction 
38.6 19756 Papalanto 
Power Plant 
CCECC Construction 2.17 70000 Rehabilatition 
of Palanto- 
Lagos 
expressway, 
Athletes's 
village, Ikot 
Akpaden- 
Okorette road, 
Lekki Free 
Trade zone 
CSCEC Construction, 
real estate 
58.9 121500 Refinery 
Sinoma Cement 
Engineering 
construction 
2.9 9000 In collaboration 
with Nigeria 
Dangot Group 
for cement 
production line 
EPC project in 
2008 
CGC Construction 0.3  Kebbi Airport, 
Water supply 
project in 
Gombe, Sakke 
Dam 
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Huawei Telecom 25 51000 Network, 
handsets 
ZTE Telecom 13 85232 CDMA, 
handsets 
Source: Margaret Egbula and Qi Zheng (2011) 
 
Although there are many factors that have previously affected the industry such as 
the implementation of neo- liberal Structural Adjustment Program (SAPs) that scrapped 
the cotton commodity board, which was responsible for the growth and sustenance of 
cotton, and other local mismanagement, Chinese imports destroyed local industries 
(Akinrinade & Ogen, 2008, p. 165). The importation of cheap products stays the most 
important factor that is responsible for the death of the Nigerian textile industry. “About 
40 percent of the 40 million meters of wax and other fabrics imported monthly from 
China to Africa find their way to Nigeria through smuggling” (ibid, p. 165). There are 
also some reports that revealed that 80 percent of textile consumption in Nigeria comes 
from smuggled textile materials from China, while only 20 percent come from local 
industries (Akinrinade & Ogen, 2008, p. 165). The massive importation of Chinese 
textiles has devastated the Nigerian textile industry by massively reducing local 
production to a pathetic shamble (Akinrinade & Ogen, 2008, p. 166).  
 Prior to the invasion of neo- liberalism and Chinese fabrics, “the Nigerian textile 
industry was the largest single private sector of the economy in terms of investments, 
output, turnover, and the second largest employer of labor after the federal government” 
(ibid, p. 166). The industry coped with local demand and exported its surplus products. 
Seeing that Chinese textile provides Nigerians with cheaper access to a variety of fabrics, 
which has been attractive and beneficial to Nigerians, in the long term it is fatal to the 
Nigerian textile sector and the overall economy because it destroys local manufacturing 
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capacity and competitiveness, which also discourages foreign investment in Nigeria’s 
textile industry. China’s global strategy and competitiveness have damaging impacts on 
the Nigerian economy. Beyond the textile industry, imports from China and Chinese 
companies have also destroyed other consuming product industries in the different cities 
of Nigeria, which has resulted to additional unemployment (Obiorah et al., 2008, p. 279). 
“Six of Kaduna’s seven textile manufacturers closed down by 2006, in part due to their 
inability to compete with cheap Chinese textiles and fabrics, which had benefited from 
concessionary trade terms or had entered Nigeria through outright smuggling” (ibid, p. 
279). 
The unemployment pool heightened when several other textile factories in the 
country such as the Western Textile mills, Enpee, Aba Textiles, closed their operations 
(Obiorah et al., 2008, p. 279). Resentment has also grown over the use of Chinese 
laborers in construction projects, along with the increasing take over of Chinese traders in 
Nigerian markets (Obiorah et al., 2008, p. 280). Unemployment is posing a problem in 
almost every sector, because as Nigerian companies close due to inefficiency and 
problems of competing with Chinese products, their laborers add to the other 
unemployment pool. China has always been criticized for employing its own workers, 
which has increased the Chinese population in Nigeria. Chinese companies operate with 
their workers. They bring in their workers from China to settle in established companies 
to work, manage and monitor other few local workers that have ben employed. Despite 
the fact that some Chinese companies employ local workers, Chinese workers dominate 
the job market in these factories and companies that have displaced local companies. 
“Chinese companies are notorious for their tendency to bring in their own workers as 
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opposed to bring locally... local content has no meaning to the Chinese run companies”  
(Ian Taylor, 2007, p. 633). 
Moreover, in spite of the different FTZs financed by China that should create jobs 
in Nigeria and open more opportunities for businesses, there is still a great concern and 
increasing skepticism on this topic. Unemployment has been a problem for everyone in 
the country. Although China employs local workers the disparity between the 
unemployment and the manufacturing jobs that have been lost are high (Margaret Egbula 
and Qi Zheng, 2011, p. 18). Only a certain amount of lost jobs have been recovered. 
Comparing the amount of available jobs offered by Chinese companies in Nigeria to the 
ones lost to those companies, the difference is troublesome. Only small portions of 
Nigerians are re-employed in some of these companies. Another major concern to the 
employment factor with Chinese companies is labor. With the little amount of Nigerians 
that are employed by Chinese companies, labor conditions have been an obstacle. Labor 
unions have complained about working conditions in Chinese companies where workers 
are poorly paid and treated badly (Egbula & Zheng, 2011, p. 18).  
Safety standards within their industries have also been a concern (Taylor, 2007, p. 
633). The fire incident at a Chinese-owned industry in Ikorodu Town, Lagos State 
revealed that it was standard practice to lock the workers while on duty, which hindered 
the workers chance to escape from the fire, and resulted in many loosing their lives 
(Taylor, 2007, p. 633). Officials reported the event without further investigations of the 
incident. Given the corrupt tendencies of Nigerian officials, it is very probable that safety 
inspectors were bribed to forget the incident without investigating. There have also been 
submissions that Chinese firms in Nigeria maltreat their workers. “According to a report, 
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the conditions of employment of Nigerians in Chinese firms neither conform with the 
Nigeria Labour Laws (NLL) nor to that of the International Labour Organisation (ILO)” 
(Olawale Ogunkola et al., 2008, p. 7). Reported work practices have been a barrier and 
have let many Nigerians relentless to work in Chinese firms. Overall, there are genuine 
issues surrounding Chinese labor practices in Nigeria. With a weak and corrupted state 
like Nigeria, it is unexpected for appropriate policies and regulations to be implemented 
for the benefits of Nigerians. It has also been reported that technology transfer from 
Chinese FDI is meaningless, because most of the Chinese firms bring finished products 
and complete equipment with Chinese technicians into the country (Olawale Ogunkola et 
al., 2008, p. 7). 
Chinese investment flows in Nigeria 
China’s FDI in Nigeria has increased as well. Most of its FDI is directed towards 
infrastructure, agro- allied industry, manufacturing, and communication sector 
(Olugbogeya Oyeranti et al., 2011, p. 186). See figure 3 for China’s finance commitments 
in Nigeria by sector. Chinese FDI is primarily resource seeking and market seeking, 
which allows them to go into partnership with enterprises (Oyeranti et al., 2011, p. 190). 
Most FDIs are carried out by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A considerable amount of 
China’s FDI is directed towards investments in the infrastructure to accentuate the role of 
Chinese Multinational Companies (MNCs) in Nigeria, which will later facilitate trade and 
the establishment of Chinese industries in Nigeria. China proposes different projects to 
Nigeria’s government, which in turn is seen as an opportunity to build infrastructure and 
increase investments. Most of these projects are appealing as they portray opportunities 
for attracting foreign investors and developing the country. Most of the FDIs trigger trade 
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activities between both countries, and has an impact in the trade relations. China has 
invested a lot of money in the devel
benefit of industrialization and trade. Some of the FTZs have been established, and some 
are still under construction. The kajola Specialized Railway Industrial Free Trade Zone, 
the Ofada Vee Tee Rice Limited, the Ogu
the Lekki Free trade Zone (LFTZ) are the most populous of China’s investment in the 
trading sector, distinct from imports and other Chinese companies that have been 
established. Findings from the different projects
Figure 3: Chinese infrastructure finance commitments in Nigeria by sector, 2001
2007
Source: Oyeranti el al (2011)
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and industries offering services to both projects of the federal government. Some of the 
investors expected in the zone are: railway industrial park, locomotive workshop, railway 
related services, metal fabrications, foundries, shopping centers, logistics, new towns 
development, Commerce & Industries (Fruit Juice Processing, Ceramic Making, Diary 
Production, Furniture Making, Adire and Garment production and Kola Processing). 
Various activities ranging from acquisition of 2000 hectares of land to sourcing of 
environmental baseline data to identification of resettlement sites for affected people to 
design of infrastructural development plan have transcended in the launch of the Zone 
(Oyeranti et al., 2010, p. 58). 
The zone is a joint venture of the Ogun State Government and the Chinese Civil 
Engineering Construction Company (CCECC). The company’s investment was estimated 
at about Naira 115.8 billion. The government imagined that the project would simplify 
the rapid industry growth of the State and deepen foreign direct investment inflow to the 
state. Since this free trade zone is one of the three to be recognized in the state, it will 
serve as a growth pole (Oyeranti et al., 2010, p. 58). 
 2. The Ofada Vee Tee Rice Limited 
This is one other project involving the Ogun state and a Chinese firm. The 
company’s equity shares are to be owned by the Ogun State government, the Federal 
Government and Vee Tee Group with the latter holding the majority of the shares 
(Oyeranti et al., 20010, p. 58). The company has a design capacity of 225, 000 (9000 
bags) tons of rice per day with an estimated capital of $2 billion. The company will 
produce rice that will compare positively to those around the world. The local farmers are 
to provide paddy rice to the company (de-husking, de-stoning, parboiling, sorting, polish, 
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packaging and marketing) by the company. The large volume of rice to be imported will 
signal a huge potential demand of the commodity and thus market will not be a barrier to 
the performance of the company (Oyeranti et al., 2010, p. 59).  
Optimal benefits from the establishment of this corporation require proper 
integration of rice farmers into the company’s plan. “The market for the paddy must be 
guaranteed. Hence a contingent plan for over- as well as under-supply of paddy rice to 
the company is required for effective response by the farmers” (ibid, p. 59). The 
backward linkage of the company is important for the economy in terms of employment 
and rural livelihood. The current prediction is that about 30,000 farmers are to source 
paddy rice to the company. Other beneficiaries, which include transporters and traders of 
the raw materials and the finished products, technological capabilities of Nigerians 
through learning by doing is necessary and this can be achieved by ensuring that qualified 
Nigerians man the company” (ibid, p. 59). Currently, there are only 100 people 
employed, and it plans to hire more when fully operational (Oyeranti et al., 2010, p. 59). 
3. The Ogun Guandgong Free Trade Zones (OGFTZ) 
In 2007, the establishment of a $500 million free trade zone in Nigeria’s Ogun 
State was announced (Martyn Davies, 2008, p. 148). This project is a tripartite project of 
two Chinese companies: Guangdong Xinguang International of Guangdong Province in 
China and China- Africa Investment Limited; and the Ogun State Government. The FTZ 
is located in Igbesa in Ogun State, and is one of the three free trade zones being 
established in the state. “The zone which is being established at the instance of the 
Chinese consortium with the support of the state in the area of land acquisition, 
processing and securing various approvals especially from the Nigeria Export Processing 
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Zone Authority (NEPZA) has about 30 Chinese currently working on the site” (Oyeranti 
et al., 2010, p. 59). The cost of the project worth about $500 million is to be financed by 
the Chinese consortium (Davies, 2008, p. 148). When completed, the FTZ will dwell of 
about 100 firms mainly engaged in the light to medium manufacturing activities 
including footwear and rubber production, ceramic 60 processing, furniture production, 
hardware and household appliances, real estate development, and light and heavy 
manufacturing plants. “These activities promised to generate direct and indirect 
employment to different categories of Nigerians” (ibid, p. 148). 
 The benefits of this project to Chinese firms have not been evaluated, making any 
cost- benefit analysis of the project unavailable. An analysis of the employment that will 
be generated from this project is also required in order to position Nigerians for the 
project. There is still ambiguity on the ability of this project to generate employment for 
Nigerians without any analysis of the nature of employment. The categories of skills, 
qualification and experience must be within the Nigerian Lawson the expert quotas 
(Oyeranti et al., 2010, p. 60). “The establishment of the project also presents various 
government agencies with challenges of monitoring and evaluation with a view to 
ensuring that the zone and the firms operating within its jurisdiction conform strictly to 
Nigerian laws” (ibid, p. 60).   
Nigerian customs, immigration and other agencies will have to play a significant 
role in order to reinforce control, because some Chinese involved in these projects have 
already been detained. There is also the need to power these agencies and organizations 
performing their duties, as there is special duty in free trade zones. In order for this 
project to be successful, there needs to be constant monitoring and follow up activities. 
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“Rigorous analysis and follow-up activities are required. For example, the local farmers’ 
capacity for the supply of 61 paddy rice as input for Vee Tee Rice should be carefully 
analyzed and appropriate measures should be taking that over-supply and under-supply 
are minimized” (ibid).   
4. The Lekki Free trade Zone 
The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Lagos State 
Government (represented by Lekki Worldwide Investment Limited-LWIL) and the 
Chinese Government (represented by Nanjing Jiangning Development Zone in the 
Jiangsu Province and the China Railway Construction Corporation) in 2007 signaled the 
beginning of the Lekki free trade zone (Oyeranti et al., 2010, p. 61). “Prior to the signing 
of the MOU, the Lekki Free Trade Development Company was incorporated in Lagos in 
April 2006 as a joint venture among CCECC-BEYOND, the Lagos State Government 
and the LWIL. It was registered by the Nigerian Export Processing Zones Authority 
(NEPZA) as the developer, operator and manager of the LFTZ” (ibid, p. 61). The main 
missions of the LTFZ are to develop an offshore economic growth zone, attract foreign 
investment, promote export, generate job opportunities, minimize capital flight, and 
establish a one- stop global business haven (Oyeranti et al., 2010, p. 61).  
The establishment of the zone required a $267 million investment for the first 
phase. The project links three Chinese companies and the Lagos state government 
(Taylor, 2007: 632). The first-phase covers an area of 15 square kilometers, with China 
investing $200 million and the Nigerians $67 millions (Taylor, 2007, p. 632). After the 
completion, Phase I will habit an industrial park incorporating light industry, textiles, 
building materials, household electric appliances, communications, machine processing, 
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real estate and gardening (Taylor, 2007, p. 632). “Phase II and III intends to cover 150 
square kilometers with a total investment of $5 billion, focusing on heavy industry 
manufacturing, chemicals, petroleum processing, pharmaceuticals, cars, logistics, 
import/export businesses, a deep-water port, tourism, real estate, education, banking and 
finance, among others” (ibid, p. 632). The head of the Chinese delegation signing the deal 
reassured Nigerians that the products made and imported into the FTZ would follow 
international standards since the zone will be an international location for manufacturers 
(Taylor, 2007, p. 632).  
Summary: China as the vanguard of Nigeria’s commerce  
Although the benefits of the FTZ are enormous, there are many views that 
Chinese are harmful to the economy if not properly checked (Onayemi Bamidele, 2012, 
p. 1). “Thompson Adeyemo, deputy managing director of LFTZ, says the free trade zone 
initiative in Nigeria is like a honeycomb for dying Chinese industry which was hit badly 
during the economic meltdown as their products were rejected in many European and 
American countries” (ibid, p. 1). With a growing strong belief that Lekki Free Trade 
Zone (LFTZ) is mostly attractive to Chinese due to the fact the Chinese government 
encourages their companies, which are shutting down in China to move out, there has 
been a mixed feeling about the establishment of the LTFZ. The Chinese companies in the 
LFTZ have been promised 100% return on their investments, 100% repatriation of 
capital, profits and dividends out of Nigeria and are free to bring their workers in to work 
in Nigeria (Bamidele, 2012, p. 1). Therefore, there has been balancing discussions over 
the benefits of the LFTZ to Nigeria. 
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Bilateral trade between both countries is expected to increase. Mostly imports 
from China, due to Nigeria’s inability of creating an industrialized economy, and China’s 
derived benefits from Nigeria’s economy. In 2010, China Ocean Shipping Group 
Company (COSCO), the largest shipping company in China, established its West Africa 
hub in Nigeria’s economic capital, Lagos (Egbula & Zheng, 2011, p. 8). “In 
November 2010, a Chinese joint venture between China Merchants and the China- Africa 
Development Fund paid USD 154 million for a 47.5 % stake in the Tin-Can Container 
Terminal at Lagos Port” (ibid, p. 8). The container is Nigeria’s second largest container 
terminal at the Lagos Port. Along with that, there are many agreements that have been 
signed between both countries in the different sectors to enhance productivity. The trade 
imbalance and other conditions that have been ascending from the partnership is only a 
start.   
The pressing problem from the creation of FTZs in Nigeria is the increased 
development of a market that is habited by Chinese industries. Chinese companies are 
already populous in Nigeria, and it has created a negative effect, to Nigerian industries as 
well as Nigerians. The increased establishment of China’s companies has not allowed any 
potential development of the Nigerian industry, which was already weak. On the 
contrary, it has contributed to the loss of the few industries that still existed. No potential 
manufacturing company has been able to grow with Chinese firms operating in the 
country, which makes it worse for medium- size companies. The creation of FTZs will 
bring investments and growth to Nigeria economy, but its market will be influx with 
Chinese companies, not aiding the development of Nigeria’s industry, nor Nigeria’s 
export orientation. The settlement of Chinese firms will impede any attempt of Nigeria to 
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promote industries and enterprises in the country. The trade imbalance will become 
critical in Nigeria’s economy, as most of the items to be sold by Chinese companies will 
be either manufactured from China and imported into the country or produced locally by 
Chinese firms. There will be a vast availability of cheap products that will be dumped in 
the market. Along with this, the generation of employment factor remains questioned, as 
well as labor practices.  The uncertainty will only arise, because Nigeria already has a 
high percentage of unemployment.   
 China’s bilateral trade relations with Nigeria has produced a complex situation 
that creates many questions and concerns that need to be investigated for the benefits of 
the Nigerian economy. Its trade foreign policy is mainly driven to increase the benefits of 
its economy and interests in Nigeria. While the relations seem like a good strategy for 
investments in the trading sector, most of these investments are for the pursuit of China’s 
sole purpose. On the other hand, because Nigeria wants to develop its economy and 
markets, the trade relations look more attractive to the government. The rate of 
unemployment, social dislocation, and financial losses with local industries and markets 
will result in a severe national socio-economic, distributional and poverty that will be 
suicidal to Nigeria if appropriate policies and measures are not implemented. 
 
China’s thirst for Nigerian Oil 
This section narrates (1) China’s approach for securing access to Nigeria’s 
energy; (2) Nigeria’s policies and its effects on Chinese dominant power in the oil sector; 
and (3) the dynamics of China’s presence in the Niger- Delta.  
Chinese entry into the Niger- Delta      
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China’s quest for oil security has attracted it to many African countries. Nigeria 
was not viewed as a stable country for China’s oil operations for a while, but in time this 
came to change. China enticed strong relations with Nigeria, and its interest in the oil 
sector has been growing along with the relations. China has invested in Nigeria’s oil 
sector through different ways, and these investments have been flourishing so far. 
Although the main reasons behind these investments are debatable, it is important to 
analyze and understand the different investments and actions China is taking in the 
country, and the reasons behind them. 
1. Oil strategy 
China’s entry into Nigeria’s oil sector was disturbing, because Chinese companies 
partook in anomaly activities and methods. Despite that it followed its usual strategy, the 
irregularities in its entrance are inconvenient. China’s ability to gain access to resources 
is usually tied to its aid package, which gives it an advantage and simplifies its entry 
compared to other countries. By using aid, China supports infrastructure creation, which 
allows it to facilitate entry into different markets. Before China could gain entry into 
Nigeria’s oil, it had to position it self as a good candidate to build some of Nigeria’s 
infrastructure as a goodwill project to gain the friendship and trust needed for other 
projects. During the first Forum on China- Africa Co- Operation (FOCAC) in 2000, 
Nigeria was able to secure a deal with the China Civil Engineering Construction 
Corporation (CCECC) to build 5,000 housing units for athletes participating in the eighth 
annual all- Africa games in Abuja (Gregory Mthembu- Salter, 2009, p. 7). After the units 
were built, Nigeria and China signed agreements on the establishment of trade offices in 
both countries (Mthembu- Salter, 2009, p. 7). China’s portrayal as the ideal candidate to 
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build Nigeria’s infrastructure was reinforced with president Olusegun Obasanjo’s several 
visits to China. Obasanjo was impressed by China’s large buildings and roads, and saw 
China as a good partner to accomplish its interests.  
Considering that ANOCs have always been reluctant to invest directly in 
Nigeria’s oil because of the instability in the region, Obasanjo was able to negotiate and 
attract them into the region. China was therefore interested in enlarging its oil operations 
in this resource rich country. Through illegal agreements, shady deals and corruption, 
China’s toehold in the Nigerian’s oil sector was established.  
“Although the Gulf of Guinea became one of the new oil exploration frontiers at 
the turn of the century, and Nigeria holds over 60% of the known reserves in the 
region, the ANOCs shunned Nigeria for the reasons above: It took high level 
lobbying by President Obasanjo from the middle of 2004 to entice some ANOCs 
into Nigeria for the first time. His proposition was hard to resist, he would 
guarantee oil blocks at discounted rates or with signature bonus waivers, in return 
for their investments in infrastructure projects. Asian companies would get 
lucrative contracts while Asian national oil companies would be granted 
preferential access to oil blocks” (Vines et al., 2009, p. 8). 
 
These deals prompted ANOCs, and ANOCs saw it as a new partnership industry. 
Obasanjo had many objectives in mind by allowing the entry of ANOCs in Nigeria’s oil. 
One of them was to raise reserves to 40 billion barrels and to raise production capacity 
(Vines et al., 2009, p. 12). He also wanted to attract new large-scale investments and 
players. But his main objective was to increase investments in Nigeria as a return for 
allowing International Oil Companies (IOCs) extract Nigeria’s oil. Obasanjo held four 
important licensing rounds to achieve these objectives: the 2000, 2005, 2006 and 2007 
licensing rounds. These rounds would also serve as an opportunity to put some order into 
the award of oil blocks in Nigeria. These rounds serve as a way for Obasanjo to play 
ANOCs against each other, in order to secure to best deal for Nigeria as well. The 
A Tale of Two Superpowers: Nigeria and China Relations 
 85
different licensing rounds that are significant to China’s access to the oil sector need to be 
discussed for a clear understanding of China’s actions in Nigeria.  
A. The 2000 licensing round 
This was the first licensing round where Obasanjo tried to operate under a 
transparent system. Under military rule, oil blocks were awarded to friends and families 
that were later sold to oil companies for profits. Obasanjo revoked the awards of the oil 
blocks that were given by military rulers to their associates and families. The 2000 round 
featured 33 blocks with 22 offshore. Only 8 blocks were taken up and awarded to an 
indigenous company behind closed doors, for criteria that were not revealed to the public. 
ANOCs barely showed any interest in the 2000 round licensing (Vines et al., 2009, p.12) 
 B. The 2005 licensing round 
This round was Nigeria’s first open auction, where bids were recorded 
simultaneously for the public. Out of the 77 blocks offered only 44 were awarded. This 
licensing round also introduced the RFR, which favored Asian bidders, because prior to 
the auction, the president had concluded deals with many of them, promising them blocks 
in return for their investments (see table 3). Because, Obasanjo also holds the position of 
the Minister of Petroleum, and acts independently without consultation from the Nigeria 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the Department of Petroleum Resources 
(DPR), the bidding rounds were classified as non-transparent. In this deal China would be 
granted oil blocks for building the Kaduna refinery, the double track, standard- gauge 
Lagos- Kano railway, and the hydroelectric complex at Mambilia (Vines et al., 2009, 
p.14). For some reason, none of these deals were consolidated, because China 
misunderstood the process thinking it had secured the oil blocks and failed to bid. 
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Table 3: Summary of strategic deals with Chinese oil companies 
Country Strategic Deals 
China Core investor in the Kaduna refinery 
Construction of the double- track, standard- 
gauge Lagos- Kano railway                                    
Construction of a hydroelectric complex at 
Mambilia (3 Gorges Project) 
Source: Vines et al (2009) 
    
C. The 2006 mini- round  
 
The 2006 mini round was mostly for countries such as China who failed to secure 
oil blocks in the previous rounds. This round was a success for Chinese oil companies. 
The deals that were discussed and agreed upon at the last bidding round were available to 
China. China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was offered four blocks; two in 
the Niger Delta and two in the frontier Chad Basin (Vines et al., 2009, p. 16) (see table 
4). These bids were the ones China had failed to secure at the last round. “In return, 
CNPC committed to investing some $2 billion in the ailing Kaduna refinery” (ibid, p. 
16).  
 D. The 2007 licensing round 
This round resulted to later biddings, because it was held two weeks before the 
change of regime in Nigeria. In this round, a total of 24 blocks were offered with 24 pre- 
assigned on the RFR terms. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) had four 
blocks pre- assigned in return for a $2.5 billion loan from China’s Exim Bank for the 
Lagos/ Kano railway upgrade and for the construction of a hydroelectric power project at 
Mambilla (Vines et al., 2009, p. 18) (see table 4). Despite the offers, China did not bid in 
the licensing round due to concerns of the upcoming elections and the new government 
that might come into power.  
Table 4: Blocks offered to China on RFR terms, 2005- 07 
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ANOC Blocks with RFR Round Taken up 
CNPC 4 2006 4 
 
1 2007                        None 
CNOOC 4 2007                        None 
 
2 2005                        None 
Source: Vines et al (2009) 
 
2. From oil for infrastructure to oil for cash 
Obasanjo was the initiator of the “oil for infrastructure” policy in Nigeria. With 
the different licensing rounds organized to secure investments, these deals were portrayed 
as a win- win situation for both countries at the time. Getting infrastructure by giving oil, 
while increasing the production of oil at the same time. The oil for infrastructure policy 
was also the primary reason why Chinese firms gained contracts and relocated to Nigeria.  
By this time, China had an advantage to increase its presence in Nigeria’s oil sector, and 
increase Chinese MNCs’ Nigerian market share. “Chinese MNCs won significant new 
contracts in Nigeria during this period, particularly in construction, telecommunications, 
power and transport” (Mthembu- Salter, 2009, p. 7). This policy helped Chinese MNCs 
to integrate Nigerian markets faster rather than relying on the “tied aid” that will later be 
beneficial when the “oil for infrastructure” policy changed. Some of the deals acquired 
debuted while some remained static as the new president had opposing ideas for 
Nigeria’s investments. 
Despite Obasanjo’s efforts to secure investments for infrastructure, some of its 
ambitions were never achieved. After the change of regime in Nigeria, the new president 
Umaru Ya’Ardua cancelled most of the “oil for infrastructure” projects. After president 
Ya’Ardua took office, he launched reviews of all the “oil for infrastructure” projects’ 
signed between the Nigerian government and Asian oil companies (Mthembu- Salter, 
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2009, p. 7). Most of the projects were either suspended or under cancellation. He called 
for an investigation of the 2007 round that had negative results, and prompted 
investigations for the 2005 and 2006 rounds as well. Due to the investigation, the 
rehabilitation of the Lagos- Kano railway and the construction of Mambilla power station 
were placed on hold (Mthembu- Salter, 2009, p. 13). The Kaduna refinery project was 
also uncertain, because the Chinese agreed to manage the project as pre- condition to 
winning oil blocks. This project was also under review due to disinterest from the 
Chinese firm (Ian Taylor, 2007, p. 637). Out of all the deals that were signed during the 
bidding round, only CNOOC’s purchase of 45% stake in Oil Mining lease (OML) 
survived (Mthembu- Salter, 2009, p. 15). 
Other projects that survived were projects where Chinese companies bought 
assets, through the strategic deals and licensing rounds’ period (see table 5), along with 
power projects in which Chinese companies had stake. One is the 335 MW Olorunsogo, 
Papalanto gas- turbine power station in Ogun state, where the Electric Power 
Construction Corporation began construction in late 2005 with a cost of $220.7 million, 
of which 35% is coming from the government and the balance from a credit facility 
provided by the Exim Bank (ibid, p. 15). The other power project is the 335 MW 
Omotosho gas- turbine power station in Ondo State, completed by the China National 
Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation in 2007 financed by the Exim 
Bank (Mthembu- Salter, 2009, p. 15).  
Table 5: Total assets of China in Chronological order 
Company Date Blocks Comment 
Sinopec 5-May JDZ Block 2 28%; operator wef 
Mar 06 
CNOOC 6-Jan OML 130 Bought contractor 
rights for US$2.3bn 
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CNOOC Mars-06 OPL 229 Bought 35% 
CNPC 2006 Round OPLs 471, 298, 732, 
721 
Strategic deal 
Source: Vines et al (2009) 
 
Another reason for changing the “oil for infrastructure” policy, was Ya’ Ardua’s 
lack of belief in the establishment of projects promised by Chinese companies. The result 
of the cancellation of many of these projects was disagreeable to some of the Chinese 
companies, because some of them had invested in them. But, Ya’Ardua opened new 
opportunities for many of these companies to secure oil supplies in Nigeria’s oil. 
President Ya’ Ardua changed the policy to “oil for cash”. The new policy proved to be 
more interesting to Chinese MNCs than the previous policy. Through this policy, Chinese 
oil companies were able to buy assets, and secure more reserves in Nigeria’s oil. In 2006, 
CNOOC paid $2.3 billion to buy contractor rights, through a private sale in a lucrative 
block, OML in the Akpo Field, with 600- 1,000 million barrels reserves (see table 6).  
That same year, CNOOC also paid $60 million for a 35% working interest in Oil 
prospecting License (OPL), where it tends to pump $1.5 billion into the development of 
the field (Mthembu- Salter, 2009, p. 15). Petro China signed an agreement with the 
NNPC for the daily supply of 30,000 barrels of oil to China for five years that same year 
(Cyril Obi, 2008, p. 422). The acquisition of oil reserves heightened overtime. “Sinopec, 
which agreed in June 2009 to pay $7.2 billion for Canada’s Addax, thereby gaining 
control of substantial Nigerian oil reserves, has the Chinese government as it majority 
shareholder “ (Mthembu Salter, 2009, p. 27). See table 6 for a summary of the different 
investments and blocks owned by Chinese oil companies in Nigeria.  
Table 6: The presence of Chinese companies in Nigeria’s oil sector 
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Companies Year Project/Block Project coat 
(USD) million 
Investment 
commitment 
(USD million)  
Sinopec 2006 Blocks OML 
64,66 and 
exploitation of 
Stubb Creek 
                            
- 
220.7 
Sinopec 2006 29% stake and 
operating rights 
to block 2, 
Nigeria- Sao 
Tome Joint 
Development 
Zone 
                            
- 
                         -                    
CNPC 2006 Licenses for OPL 
471, 721, 732, 
298 
16 16 
CNPC 2006 Stake in Kaduna 
refinery and 
rehabilitation 
2000                     
Failed 
CNOOC 2006 45% interest in 
offshore 
exploitation 
license, OML 130 
2268 2692 
CNOOC 2006 35% working 
interest in OPL 
229 
                            
- 
60 
Sinopec 2006 Provide seismic 
exploration 
service 
                            
- 
10 
Zhonghao 
Overseas 
Construction 
Engineering 
Company 
 
2007 Exploration of 
solid minerals in 
Zamfara and oil 
in Sokoto basin 
300 300 
Sinopec 2009 Purchase of 
Addax 
7200 7200 
CSEC 2010 Costruction of 
refinery in Lekki 
Free trade zone in 
Lagos state 
8000 6400 
Source: Gregory Mthembu-Salter (2009) 
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China has also contributed a significant amount of money to FTZs in Nigeria’s oil 
and gas exploration. The FTZs that are operational and non operational include the 
Calabar Free Trade Zone which specializes in non-oil, oil & gas export, the Snake Island 
and Lekki Free Zone which specializes in oil & gas equipment fabrication, Olokonla Free 
Trade Zone in Ondo state specializes in Oil & Gas, Badagry free zone specializing in 
deep sea oil exploration, and the Onne Free Zone, in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, 
specialized in Oil and Gas (Onayemi Bamidele, 2012, p. 1). China has formed different 
FTZ in the oil sector, aside from owning assets in the oil industry, which also proves its 
long-term interest and strategy in that sector of the economy.  As a result of the diverse 
purchases in the oil sector, increased criticisms of China’s intentions have grown. China 
has emphasized its interest to be purely non- exploitive in Nigeria, but Chinese actions 
and investments in its acquisition of oil blocks, assets and settlement of FTZs is 
increasingly proven otherwise.  
The dynamics and tensions of China’s presence in the Delta region 
Resistance and rebellion in the Niger- Delta 
There are other problems in the Sino- Nigerian relations around the oil industry 
that undermines China’s efforts to make this a ‘win- win’ situation. The security problem 
in the Niger Delta is increasingly problematic (Taylor, 2007, p. 637).  Following 
President Hu Jintao’s 2006 visit to Nigeria and the agreement of a $4 billion 
infrastructure investment, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) warned Chinese companies to stay clear of the Niger Delta or risk attacks 
(Taylor, 2007, p. 637). “MEND also claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack near the 
port town of Warri, stating that the blast was a warning against Chinese expansion in the 
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region, adding that the Chinese government by investing in stolen crude places its 
citizens in line of fire” (ibid, p. 638). In early 2007, MEND attacked oil installations and 
kidnapped five Chinese oil workers for fourteen days. Fourteen Chinese workers were 
also kidnapped in the first two months of 2007 alone (Taylor, 2007, p. 638). Few days 
later, it attacked another oil flow station killing fourteen soldiers and two civilians (Obi, 
2008, p. 423). As a result, several IOCs had to shut their operations reducing the number 
of barrels that were produced daily in oil fields. This was later followed by several 
attacks on some other oil fields and the abduction of workers, with their photographs in 
the media (Obi, 2008, p. 423). 
The Niger Delta region has always been unstable, mostly as a result of people’s 
growing dissatisfaction; and MEND is one of the many organizations that have been 
formed to advocate for the injustice in that region. The Delta region is the main center of 
oil producing activity in Nigeria and serves as the center of Nigeria’s economy. It 
produces 90% of Nigeria’s oil, and over 75% of the country export earnings, but this has 
hardly been felt in the region (Nseabasi Akpan and Emmanuel Akpabio, 2009, p. 12). 
The habitants of this region are dependent on their environment for daily living such as 
farming and fishing, and increasing oil exploration has had more negative environmental, 
social, and economic consequences in this community than imagined (Akpan & Akpabio, 
2009, p. 12). The activities of oil companies have had an impact in the region, and this 
has worsened. Revenue generated from exploration of oil fields has not been used to 
finance the amelioration of the region, and has left the inhabitants of the area in a 
depraved state. The continuous extraction and exploration of oil fields have resulted to 
environmental degradation, pervasive poverty in a sense of relative deprivation, and a 
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perception of alienation by host communities (Akpan & Akpabio, 2009, p. 12). “The 
adverse effects of the oil and gas industry on the fragile eco- system of the Niger Delta 
are huge” (Elias Courson, 2001, p. 25). The different effects include impact on local 
sources land, water and air coupled with poverty, unemployment and dispossession 
(Courson, 2001, p. 25). This has been further complicated by the repression of oil 
community protests against the oil industry, which has worsened the relations between 
the communities and oil companies.  In 2010, it was reported that the region was 
witnessing turbulent times with factors like gas flaring and deteriorating conditions in the 
region that is affecting sustainable growth of that sector of the economy (Economy 
Watch, 2010, p. 1). This is caused by increase competition for oil wealth. “IOCs are using 
Nigeria as their exploring base” (ibid, p. 1). 
Increasing complaints have not changed the situation in this state. The 
government chose to ignore most of these complaints for a long time until it got worse 
and resulted to attacks by different groups. MEND believes that by attacking 
Transnational Companies (TNCs) operating in the Delta region, it can seize resource 
control and power over the oil region. Its purpose is to counter the hegemony of 
transnational oil alliance in the Delta region (Obi, 2008, p. 424). The Delta region hosts 
an increasing number of TNCs operating in different oil fields. Attacks in the region are 
not new to the public, as MEND and other militant organizations use this as an 
opportunity to show their dissatisfactions to the world. The Delta region with some of the 
most prolific oil and gas fields in Africa is important to transnational oil accumulation as 
a site of extraction and production (Obi, 2008, p. 424). In the past, the government has 
partnered with TNCs to counter the attacks by increasing military and security in the 
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region, but it also aggravated the situation. The government went as far as to arrest 
several key leaders of these organizations and therefore enraged people. This has been a 
continuous battle among the Niger Delta region habitants, the government and the 
Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs), and this time Nigeria went to China for help in 
stabilizing the situation. China offered Nigeria a dozen patrol boats for their security 
issues in the Delta region. In addition to that, Nigeria tried to buy naval patrol boats from 
China to help protect the Delta region from rebel attacks (Taylor, 2007, p. 639), which 
questions the role of China in the Delta state. 
However, the kidnapping of China’s workers did not stop China from increasing 
its operations in the Delta region. China has invested a considerable amount of money in 
Nigeria’s oil, and continues to invest by buying assets and securing more rights to 
Nigeria’s oil. In spite of the fact that security plays an important factor that can affect 
China’s activities in the delta region, China has chosen to ignore it like other MNOCs, 
because China needs Nigeria’s oil. Despite the diversification of China’s investments and 
engagements, oil still plays an important role in China’s relations with Nigeria. Nigeria 
being among China’s largest oil producers, its oil production is set to double within the 
next decade (Denis Tull, 2006, p. 464). China’s interests and investments in Nigerian oil 
sector are increasingly problematic. Oil accounts for 90% of Nigeria’s revenues, and 75% 
of its exports. The commodity boom will create an over reliance and a lack of ability to 
diversify its economy. “The type of increased commodity exports and rising investment 
inflows into Africa stimulated by China’s commodity demands have a tendency to fuel 
currency overvaluation, which undermines the competitive edge of export- oriented 
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manufacturing sectors” (Ian Taylor, 2006, p. 951). Its interests in Nigeria’s oil sector are 
not sustainable for the economy, because it enhances lack of diversification.  
Implications of China’s energy and resources extraction in Nigeria 
Sinopec’s purchase of Canada’s Addax Petroleum was its largest overseas deal, 
which gave Sinopec oil operations in Gabon, as well as operation rights across the Gulf 
of Guinea (Margaret Egbula and Qi Zheng, 2011, p. 12). “Within a year, Sinopec 
announced the discovery of a high-yield oil and gas reserve in the UDELE-3 well in 
Nigeria, which is expected to yield 3,365 barrels of oil and 28 300 cubic meters of gas 
per day” (ibid, p. 12). 
Besides buying assets from Addax, China looked to expand its control of the 
Nigeria’s oil sector. In 2008, CNOOC was negotiating to buy interests in two Nigerian 
offshore blocks from Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, worth up to $900 
million each (Ndubisi Obiorah et al., 2008, p. 278). China’s investments in natural 
resources in Africa have always been criticized due to China’s vast contribution to the oil 
sector. It has always been viewed, as a strategy to secure oil needs for China while 
creating dependency in African countries that will rely on such investments. This is 
actually, the situation that is rising in Nigerian’s oil sector. The upsurge in Chinese oil 
diplomacy may be linked to the priorities of China’s strategist interest priority long-term 
goal to be in charge of oil resources while manipulating future prices, which threatens 
Africa’s dependency on oil (Taylor, 2006, p. 943).  
The apprehension gets more complicated considering that Nigeria may suffer 
from the Dutch Disease. For a country such as Nigeria not to be affected by the Dutch 
Disease or resources curse, there needs to be several policies implemented such as 
A Tale of Two Superpowers: Nigeria and China Relations 
 96
enhancing investments in the non-tradable sector, increasing human capital, and contain 
inflationary tendencies that result from commodity booms (Ali Zafar, 2007, p. 114). 
Without strict management, and appropriate policies from governments, oil rich countries 
will be affected by prices and become dependent on China (Zafar, 2007, p. 114). Seeing 
that Nigeria has been more concerned with developing its infrastructure and getting cash 
for its oil, some of these policies have been neglected. The “oil for infrastructure” 
diplomacy allowed Nigeria to fund its increasing demand for infrastructure, which was to 
be paid through oil blocks, because it was viewed as the easiest solution to get the 
projects paid. Obasanjo viewed the ability to gain investments by giving out its oil. 
Fortunately this policy was changed, the new policy is not much better.  
“Oil for cash” did not only help China gain assets and gain power into Nigeria’s 
oil sector, but it continues Nigeria’s’ continuous dependency on the oil sector for its 
revenues. In the absence of right policies or monitoring the cycle that has been planted by 
past MNOCs, things will only worsen between China in Nigeria, considering that China’s 
investments in the country are stupendous. If Nigeria has had ability to manage its 
resources extraction, as well as its revenues, the problem wouldn’t have been as 
disturbing as it is. Most of its revenue from oil has disappeared in the past, making the 
situation ambiguous. Past concerns and apprehensions over China’s actions has not been 
meaningless, because till recently China’s actions are still controversial and detrimental 
to that sector. In 2012, a report was published on Nigeria’s illegal deals with IOCs to 
secure oil. It was discovered that Nigeria has lost out tens of billions of dollars in oil and 
gas revenues from cut price deals between MNCs and government officials (Clara 
Nwachukwu, 2012, p. 1). In these deals, “Addax now owned by Sinopec owns Nigeria 
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$1.5 billion in unpaid royalties, part of $3 billion black hole of unpaid bonuses and 
royalties” (ibid, p. 1). China is continuously partaking in fraud deals in the oil and gas 
sector to gain benefits at the expense of worsening the resource curse in Nigeria. 
China was able to gain entry into Nigerian’s oil sector through its “aid” policy, 
which was encouraged by president Obasanjo interest for infrastructure. China’s interests 
in securing oil blocks during the licensing rounds led it to participate in some 
irregularities, that makes its role in Nigeria’s oil sector questionable, because like other 
MNOCs that have oil operations in the region, irregularities are the daily characteristics 
of their oil operations. Its subjection to such activities is also problematic, because it is 
increasing corruption in the weak state. Aside from these different actions, China’s entry 
into the oil sector is not welcomed in Nigeria, and it can exacerbate the environmental 
conditions, because China’s vast investments in the exploration of oil and gas will only 
increase and deepen some of the issues in that region, if a solution is not provided. More 
so because China has proven not to be the best in following environmental and standard 
laws, and its inability to do that in its country and in Nigeria since the beginning of its 
involvement is problematic to a weak state like Nigeria. Nigeria has no effective 
institution in place to monitor such actions.  
Increasing oil and gas explorations and extractions means increasing commodity 
export for Nigeria. China’s oil policy interests are to extract resources for its energy 
security. While this solution increases growth and aligns with Nigeria’s interests of 
increasing production and exploring gas fields, there is little opportunity to diversify its 
reliance on its resource sector and increase its exports from other sectors of the economy. 
Nigeria’s over reliance on its resources is dubious for its economy, and its future 
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activities. Not only does it pose a problem to the revenue and environment sector, but it 
also affects local citizens and the economy over all. China’s involvement in the oil sector 
in Nigeria has created a perplexed result like in its trade relations. 
 
Debt Overhang 
This section explores China’s aid and debt policy in African countries as a 
comparison to traditional donors aid programs, and the rising effects of China’s loans to 
Nigeria, as a result of this policy. 
Rethinking aid and debt 
China has not only positioned itself as a good trading partner, but also as a good 
lender to African countries that now prefer borrowing from China. Its aid program is 
glued to its economic engagement, and it features characteristics that differs from the 
west and appeals to African countries as well as Nigeria. 
1. Beijing versus the West 
 China’s first and foremost advantage in its aid package as compared to the West 
is the infrastructure funding (Deborah Brautigam, 2009, p. 133). “For a host of reasons, 
Western aid for infrastructure fell far behind funding for the social sectors” (ibid, p. 133). 
Because, China agrees to give loans and grants for building infrastructure in African 
countries, its aid is welcomed and accepted without hesitation. Its second advantage is the 
implementation of aid approach. The west has emphasized host country “ownership” and 
the alignment of aid with partner country’s agenda (Brautigam, 2009, p. 134). China’s 
ability to eliminate conditionality in its aid package has presented challenges to the global 
aid regime because African countries are more attracted to China’s aid program. The “no 
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strings attached” policy, whereby most of its aid is distributed if countries recognize the 
“one china policy” has been welcomed. The recognition of this policy is the only 
conditionality for China’s aid.  
Considering that most African countries have been subjected to many conditions 
from the West, the World Bank, and the International Monetary fund (IMF) for 
development projects in their countries, the ability to have this embargo lifted is a relief 
for African leaders (Brautigam, 2009, p. 133). These two components to its aid program 
give China an immeasurable advantage in Africa. Other features of China’s approach 
include, the increase of investments despite debt, the refusal to slow debt- financed 
infrastructure, and the ease of the debt cancellation process (Brautigam, 2009, p. 148). 
Loans from China and the West are incomparable.  
“The World Bank’s loans in most African countries are zero- interest, with 
repayment over thirty-five to forty years ‘this is called IDA terms’, while most of 
Chinese Exim bank loans, and the growing number of China Development Bank 
loans and supplier’s credits growing number of Chinese companies are at market 
rates, and usually need to be repaid in ten to twenty years” (ibid, p. 179). 
 
2. Nigeria’s loans and debt from the west 
Loans and debts from the west have always been obstacles to increase 
investments in Nigeria. In early 2004, Nigeria increased its efforts in persuading its 
creditors to agree on a debt package. It was able to repay a significant amount of its debt 
to the west, and it also secured debt relief.  
“In 2005, Nigeria secured significant debt relief from the Paris Club amounting to 
$18.0 billion debt relief. With the payment of the balance of $12.4 billion to its 
creditors, Nigeria exited the Paris Club debt in March 2006. Nigeria also exited 
the London Club debt on 4 April 2007 after paying off outstanding Par Bonds and 
Promissory Notes” (Helmut Reisen and Sokhn Ndoye, 2008, p. 20). 
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 Considering these endeavors from the Nigerian government, Nigeria is now below debt- 
distress threshold for both the Net Present Value (NPV) debt/Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (Reisen & Ndoye, 2008, p. 20). See table 7 and 8 for summary of Nigeria’s 
current lending from the west.  
Table 7: Number of Loans/Credits/Grants 
Status IDA 
Credits 
CPL CPLCONV  NPL Total  
Disbursing 23 0 0 0 0 23 
Repaying 22 1 4 0 0 27 
Fully 
Repaid 
1 24 14 0 41 80 
Other 28 0 0 2 0 30 
Source: The World Bank Website 
 
 
Table 8: Loans/Credits/ Grants Summary in USD Equivalent 
Status IBRD IDA Credits IDA 
Grants 
Total 
Original 
Principal 
6,248,200,000.00 9,054,215,968.81 0 15,302,415,968.81 
Cancellations 933,747,660.68 357,909,808.66 0 1,291,657,469.34 
Disbursed 5,314,452,339.32 4,855,040,875.80 0 10,169,493,215.12 
Undisbursed 0 4,037,333,553.80 0 4,037,333,553.80 
Repaid 5,297,609,873.09 363,718,514.44 0 5,661,328,387.53 
Repaid third 
party 
16,826,750.56 0 0 16,826,750.56 
Due 15,715.67 4,579,536,995.36 0 4,579,552,711.03 
Exchange 
Adjustment 
2,890.59 0 0 2,890.59 
Borrower 
Obligation 
18,606.26 4,579,536,995.36 0 4,579,555,601.62 
Source: The World Bank Website 
 
China’s aid and loans to Nigeria 
Unfortunately, China has not been transparent in its loans and grants to Nigeria, 
and a current summary of loans granted to Nigeria by China is not accessible. On the 
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other hand, China’s role on debt and its effect on Nigeria’s economic growth can be 
analyzed through its method of operations.  
1. Aid and business  
China has been categorized as an imprudent lender to African countries, which in 
turn impacts the debt sustainability of a country. There is a strong relationship between 
external debt and economic growth, which impacts the accumulation of a stock of debt so 
large as to threaten the country’s ability to repay its loans (Reisen & Ndoye, 2008, p. 11). 
Considering that China does not lend according to the financial terms and conditions set 
by the Organisation of Economic Co-Operations and Development (OECD) since some 
of its loans are neither export credits nor sufficiently concessional, there is a growing 
concern that such loans will endanger debt sustainability in countries like Nigeria (Reisen 
& Ndoye, 2008, p. 33).      
Nigeria is among the most important beneficiary of the largest flow of China’s 
financial assistance (Reisen & Ndoye, 2008, p. 37). It is also among the beneficiaries of 
new lending mostly through export credit from China. The country does not report its 
official reserves to the IMF, but its official foreign exchange reserves were estimated at 
$42 billion in 2006 (Reisen & Ndoye, 2008, p. 27). Nigeria received a comparatively 
modest amount of export credit from OECD sources: $455.8 million between 2003 and 
2006. In 2006, the Export-Import Bank of China signed globally $4.24 billion export 
buyer credits, and actually disbursed $2.27 billion with Nigeria as its major client. 
Between 2004 and 2006, $8.8 billion committed by China for natural resource (oil) 
related infrastructure in Nigeria. Sometimes, FDI flows may be the counterpart of the 
provision of loans, which was observed in Nigeria (Reisen & Ndoye, 2008, p. 37). China 
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impacts on debt ratios through stimulating exports and growths. “To be sure, debt 
vulnerability is still a concern for African raw material exporters, in view of their low 
governance scores, and their exposure to real external shocks, such as major drop in oil 
prices” (ibid, p. 37). Due to big investments and loans from China, there is a debt 
sustainability issue for the country. China impacts debt sustainability through different 
methods.  
China’s aid program needs to be acknowledged for understanding its function and 
method of increasing debt and soft power in Nigeria. Debt accumulation is structured in a 
trapped cycle of aid from China. China’s method of sustaining and increasing debt in 
African countries is related to its method of operations, which is aid. Chinese aid is 
distinct from aid from traditional donors. The way China disburses its aid is important to 
understand. China structures its aid package in such a way that it gives many advantages 
and promotes countries’ thrive to increase aid from China, while increasing their debts. 
Chinese method is specifically designed to give China business opportunities while 
increasing other countries’ debt. Basically, China combines aid with business. Its aid is 
hard to separate from its loans and grants. 
2. Concessional loans 
There are two types of loans given by China: concessional loans and non- 
concessional loans. Concessional loans are given by China Exim Bank. About 60% of the 
Exim Bank’s portfolio consists of exports seller’s credits that are large preferential loans 
for Chinese companies operating abroad, while a growing share of the bank’s portfolio 
goes to export buyer’s credits, issued to importers of Chinese goods and services to pay 
the bank over time (Brautigam, 2009, p. 113). See figure 4 for China Exim bank 
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concessional loan cycle. When a country applies for a loan, the bank does a preliminary 
appraisal report signs a framework agreement and both countries sign a project loan 
agreement (step 1-4). The contracts are then given to Chinese agencies or contractors that 
submits documents to the foreign agency or contractor (step 5). The documents are later 
submitted to the borrowing government, which asks the Exim Bank to disburse payment 
to the Chinese executing agency, and accepts responsibility for repaying the loan (step 6-
9). The non- concessional loans come from China’s Development Bank (CDB) that does 
not give official development aid, but rather development finance. It provides loans to 
other levels of the Chinese government to finance investments in domestic infrastructure 
(Brautigam, 2009, p. 115). One last important feature of China’s aid is its “tied aid” that 
requires recipients to use goods and services from the donor country, which is exactly 
what China does (Brautigam, 2009, p. 152). 
 
Figure 4: Structure of Concessional Loans by China Exim Bank 
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Source: Deborah Brautigam (2009)
 
 
Through China’s loan, aid and debt relief program, a cycle of constant lending has 
been created that prohibits and poses a problem to debt sustainability. By using debt 
relief to assist the country, turning it into loans and 
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stronghold on governments (Joshua Einsenman and Joshua kurlantzick, 2006, p. 221). 
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technology, goods and other related things for the completion of the contract. Therefore, 
China benefits from the contracts, while charging Nigeria for the project, and equipment 
used to complete the project. The pattern of providing infrastructure in Nigeria through 
China’s financial resources creates an issue of debt accumulation. “The issue of debt 
accumulation and servicing is important because Chinese financing or loans may not be 
as generous as we might thought and induce to contract. Therefore there is the need to 
always employ technical experts that will conduct cost analysis so that contracts are 
awarded at minimum cost” (Olugboyega Oyeranti et al., 2011, p. 198).   
Challenges of Chinese loans and investments in Nigeria 
In September 2012, it was reported that China gave Nigeria a loan of  $1.1 billion 
for the construction of its light rail, airport terminals, and a galaxy backbone (Mathias 
Okwe, 2012, p. 1). The increasing lending of China to Nigeria will further plunge the 
country into another debt trap, that Nigeria will have trouble detaching it self from, 
considering that a considerable amount of revenues has been vanishing from the 
government’s account. Debt accumulation through loans for infrastructure is not the only 
challenge for Nigeria. Nigeria’s policy of “oil for cash” is equally problematic. China has 
invested an extensive amount of money in the energy sector of the economy. Through the 
acquisition of oil assets and oil blocks in Nigeria, China has contributed a big amount in 
the energy sector that will be hard to trace due to fraud for the procurement of the several 
assets now owned by Chinese IOCs.  
China’s method of operation of non-interference also promotes corruption, which 
affects debt in Nigeria. Nigeria is a weak country where most revenues come from the oil 
sector, and this revenue has had a tendency to disappear. “Nigeria’s politics have long 
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been an open scramble for power in which elites, often utilizing the ethnic card and 
playing up tribalism and religious differences, compete for control of the state in order to 
capture the mega benefits associated with the country’s enormous oil revenues” (Ian 
Taylor, 2007, p. 642).  Given that China has been involved in irregularities in the past and 
is still partaking in such acts in order to secure oil blocks, China is already in the 
patronage system of the Nigerian oil industry.  
The oil industry has undermined democracy, heightened corruption, patronage, 
and lack of accountability in Nigeria. It is the motto of making business in the Delta 
region. In November 2012, a report by the government- commissioned task force 
indicates that US$100 billion from Nigeria’s oil and gas industry since 2002 is missing 
(Africa Confidential, 2012, p. 3). In this same report, Addax, now owned by China, owns 
the government millions of signature bonuses (Clara Nwachukwu, 2012, p. 1). By 
benefiting from oil receipts, there has been no urgency to generate revenues for the 
economy. Seeing that Chinese IOCs have been subject to such actions in Nigeria, it can 
be concluded that China’s policy is promoting corruption, with a lack of accountability to 
the government. Rents from benefits have failed to promote economic growth and 
development, because wealth generation depends on the manipulation of the market for 
personal reasons of power and profit (Ian Taylor, 2006, p. 957). 
China’s presence in Nigeria lowers export diversification and also has a negative 
impact on debt sustainability because it reduces product diversification (Reisen & Ndoye, 
2008, p. 39). This in turn lowers standards, undermines democratic institutions and 
increases corruption, because Nigeria is an oil rich nation that depends on it. By 
increasing raw material demand and stimulating exports of raw material, China deepens 
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Nigeria’s overreliance on its commodity, which has been the major source of fraud and 
debt accumulation over the years. “This is certainly the case with Nigeria, and Abuja’s 
leaders have rarely if ever sought to promote broad- based development. Instead, they 
have concentrated on the control of enclave economies in rather limited geographic 
spaces and on maintaining coy relationships with the multinationals “ (Taylor, 2007, p. 
642).  This has meant that there has been a lack of energy in trying to diversify key 
export commodities, which has resulted to price collapses and fluctuations.  
Loans and grants have helped Nigeria develop some of its infrastructure, while 
increasing its debt trough the attribution of enormous contracts to China at the cost of 
excluding local markets that do not benefit from any of the contracts. The loan cycle has 
significantly helped China benefit from Nigeria than Nigeria has. Corruption and lack of 
transparency are among the main concerns of the Sino- Nigerian relations. China is non- 
transparent in its investments, and the distribution of oil money is increasing corruption 
in Nigeria. The reliance on a single product that favors China also increases patronage in 
the Delta region. Its stand on the “non- interference” policy undermines democratic 
institution that affects accountability, resource control, and debt sustainability. Its foreign 
policy like in the trade, oil and debt has a big impact on Nigeria. It benefits its companies 
and economy, while handicapping local companies. By doing business and giving aid, 
China secures more benefits and affects Nigeria’s revenues. China’s investment is 
following a path that will be dubious to Nigeria on the long run. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Tale of Two Superpowers: Nigeria and China Relations 
 108
Chapter V: Conclusions & Recommendations 
 
Conclusion: A zero sum game? 
Evidence and analysis throughout this paper indicates how problematic NEEDS 
will be hard to implement in Nigeria, and how there is no understanding of what Nigeria 
wants to what China is doing. The Nigerian government does not have the ability to 
achieve the NEEDS’ goals, due to a weak institution and other factors that surround the 
state. China’s investment in Nigeria’s trade and debt has developed a mixture of positive 
and negative results in Nigeria’s economy. In regards to NEEDS, China’s engagements in 
these sectors have no alignment with the state’s objectives and have only worsen what 
was trying to be improved by the Nigerian government. The Nigerian government 
believed that by opening its markets to foreign investors like China, it could achieve its 
development aspirations. Although its partnership has been of help for increasing 
investments, developing oil and gas fields’ exploration, and increasing oil production for 
economic growth, China’s foreign policy has been obstructive to NEEDS in many ways.  
China’s investments in the trade sector does not increase Nigeria’s opportunity to 
develop its manufacturing industries, promote local and small medium enterprises, 
increase employment, reduce the importation of cheap goods, reduce goods smuggling, 
and develop Nigerian local markets. It has been contradictory to NEEDS goal of 
increasing local manufacturing of goods to promote industries, while improving Nigeria’s 
export orientation intentions. Moreover, its investments in the oil sector are only 
worsening the reliance over Nigeria’s natural resources, while degrading the environment 
and violating laws. Reducing corruption and lack of transparency, which was another 
ambition, is only deepening with China partaking in corrupted methods to secure oil 
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blocks and assets. Decreasing debt and government expenditures featured in the 
numerous goals of NEEDS can hardly be achieved with China’s aid packages and loan 
concessions. Investors like China have deviated from everything Nigeria hopes to achieve 
for its development, making it harder for the policy package to be implemented in the 
country. Ultimately, pursuing and following China’s policies and interests in Nigeria in 
hope to increase economic growth has been an obstacle to achieve Nigeria’s development 
aspirations.  
Overall, there is no doubt that China is a good economic partner that can promote 
investments and help increase economic growth in Nigeria, but China’s aid and 
partnership comes at an expense. The local markets and businesses, as well as 
employment will suffer from this partnership if right policies are not implemented. 
Nigeria’s industry, natural resources and corruption are a real challenge to any 
development in the state. China’s partnership has been relieving some urgent needs, but 
these needs cannot eradicate poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria. Its investments 
are not sustainable to Nigeria’s economy that is becoming increasingly dependent on 
China. As this study has hopefully relayed, China’s partnership with Nigeria is based on 
concrete national interests that will only depend in optimal outcomes if Nigeria puts in 
place the policies and institutions to maximize the complementary effects and minimize 
the competing effects of this relation. 
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Recommendations: The way forward 
1. Nigerian government needs to institute policies aimed at maximizing the direct and 
indirect benefits as well as minimizing the possible negative impacts (Oyeranti, el al, 
2010, p. 4) 
2. The government needs to ensure implementation of laws and regulations in Nigeria as 
well as ensure compliance by the Chinese investors (Oyeranti et al, 2011, p. 196). 
3. The Nigerian government must be conscious of the high level of unemployment 
prevalent and thereby gives local contractors some considerations in the award of 
contracts with a view t creating jobs for Nigerians. Local contractors can equally be 
encouraged to partner with Chinese firms (Oyeranti et al, 2010, p. 5). 
4. The Nigerian government needs to examine the structure of tariff and non- tariff 
barriers facing Nigeria’s exports to China. Perhaps more importantly is an analysis of 
constraints facing producers and exporters in responding fully to market openings 
(Ogunkola, 2008, p. 12). 
5. Nigeria needs to improve in negotiating tactics with Chinese MNCs, and learn from 
some of the negotiating positions that the chine government has itself adopted towards 
Western companies looking to grow their presence in China (Salter, 2009, p. 26). 
6. Chinese MNCs should be obliged to build a capacity of Nigerian sub-contractors and 
to work towards the manufacture of a growing proportion of their materials in Nigeria 
(Salter, 2009, p. 26). 
7. Make full use of other policy instruments at both countries disposal and in this context 
seek in a systematic way the highest possible degree of coherence between trade, 
economic and development policies and other policies of both countries with an impact 
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on trade, agriculture, national security, environment, social and physical and 
infrastructures and research and technology (Amadasun, 2008, p. 27). 
8. Adopt an integrated bilateral trade, economic and development framework and apply 
common sectoral economic and development policy guidelines based on identified 
priority fields (Amadasun, 2008, p. 27). 
9. The Nigerian government should take the lead and point out the disjuncture between 
Chinese activities and the norms expected and promoted if China does not abide by broad 
governance standards (Taylor, 2006, p. 957). 
10. The Nigerian government should use oil revenue to improve the state of infrastructure 
and social amenities, and should invest export receipts in activities with high employment 
potential such as agriculture and manufacturing (Adewuyi, 2010, p. 95). 
11. Nigeria should increase export to China by encouraging manufacturers and exporters, 
and the government should not enter into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China 
(Adewuyi, 2010, p. 95). 
12. Ensure better coordinations of both countries development programs and to the 
greatest extent possible use the procedures that are most beneficial (Amadasun, 2008: 
28). 
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